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The Tyneside collier seamen present a problem for the traditional 
interpretations of English trade unions in the eighteenth century. 
Their example clearly demonstrates that the attitudes and methods, 
if not the ultimate form, of defensive trade unionism predated the 
repeal of the Combination Acts and the advent of the industrial 
factory system in the nineteenth century. More importantly, this 
trade unionism existed among workers who do not conform to the 
accepted historiographic interpretations of the labor "aristocracy" 
of the eighteenth century.
The seamen's organization was intrinsically linked to both the 
economic structure of the seaborne coal trade and the social basis 
of the Tyneside maritime community. These merchant seamen enjoyed 
a distinctive status because of their expertise in manning the 
sailing ships of the collier fleet, which was recognized as the 
nursery of British naval seamen. These factors, and the moderate 
methods and effective leadership of their organization, enabled 
them to defend their economic interests against the Tyneside ship­
owners, the local magistrates and officers of the British Army and 
Navy.
Because their trade union was proscribed by English law, the 
seamen continually faced the problems of a labor group organized 
only on an extralegal and ad hoc basis. But the decade of the 
1790s presented other peculiar difficulties and was particularly 
critical in the further development of the collier seamen's trade 
unionism. During this period the seamen were faced with a rising 
cost of living, the threat of impressment into the Royal Navy and 
the perceived association of all popular disturbances, including 
labor strikes, with radical political agitation.
These conclusions are based on research, from both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources, including contemporary 
pamphlets, newspapers, printed manuscripts, unpublished manuscript 
materials and government documents, provide detailed accounts of 
the seamen's trade unionism and give insight into contemporary 
opinions and perceptions of the seamen's activities. Particularly 
informative is the correspondence between the Home Office and the 
local Tyneside officials contained in the Home Office Papers and 
the papers of the Tyne and Wear Public Records Office.
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"The Shipping of this Port . . . has been long situated in a
very alarming and critical Predicament, by the reiterated, 
arbitrary and dangerous Attempts made by the Seamen of this 
Northern Navigation, to raise the Price of their Wages, 
without any just Cause or Reason, but solely originating 
from their own Caprice, and Humour."
A Newcastle shipowner, 1790
iv
INTRODUCTION
According to labor historians, one of the first
recorded uses of the term "to strike," in the sense of a
refusal to continue work, occurred during a labor dispute
among Tyneside collier seamen in 1768.^ The belief that this
term was nautical in its derivation, presumably on the
analogy of a ship striking its mast or sail, has persisted
despite the fact that it did not originate with the collier
seamen. Instea:d, these merchant seamen used the commoner
phrase "to turn out" or the local variants "to stick" or "to
stop," which were peculiar to Durham and Northumberland. The
workers who most often "struck" in the eighteenth century
2were those engaged in the non-maritime trades. Whatever the 
true origin of this term, the perceived association of the 
collier seamen, with forced work stoppages is a clear 
indication that these workers were recognized, even by their 
contemporaries, as pre-eminent in the early English labor 
movement.
From a Marxian perspective, the early development of 
collier seamen's trade unionism appears to be 
anachronistic. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels characterized 
the pre-industrial eighteenth century as an idyllic golden 
age of benevolent cooperation between masters and labor. 
Marx and Engels argued that the recognition of the necessity 
for defensive organizations to protect the interests of
1
2
labor occurred only with the concentration and exploitation
of labor under the industrial factory system. The sense of
labor solidarity and the creation of a working class
3consciousness were products of the nineteenth century.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb disagreed with the Marxian 
interpretation. The Webbs traced the origins of the early 
labor unions to the numerous local trade and craft societies 
extant before the Industrial Revolution. The Webbs, however, 
have been accused by some modern historians of inadequately 
accounting for the development of trade unionism in the 
eighteenth century. V.L. Allen claimed that the Webbs 
ignored the basic economic and social forces which 
stimulated the growth of of trade unions and that their 
emphasis on permanent forms of organization caused them to 
neglect the more ephemeral aspects of the labor movement. 
It is true that the Webbs' research into the earliest 
manifestations of trade unions was not extensive because 
their primary interest was in the labor movement after the 
passage of the Combination Acts of 17 99 and 1800. The Webbs, 
however, did not contribute to the naive, but widely-held, 
belief that trade unions and labor conflict originated only
4after the advent of industrialization. On the contrary, 
they argued that "the earliest permanent combinations of 
wage-earners in England precede the factory system by half a
5century." The Webbs recognized that the basic social and 
economic conditions underlying the growth of trade unionism
existed in the eighteenth century: the widening disparity of 
interests of capital and labor, increasing economic 
competition and exploitation, workers' grievances concerning 
wages, working conditions and the terms of employment, and 
the disintegration of protective trade regulations and 
traditional social norms. Rather than creating the 
conditions which helped foster the growth of trade unions, 
the industrial factory system only intensified these 
pre-existing tendencies.^
As E.P. Thompson demonstrated, unskilled factory 
workers were only a minority of the English labor force in 
the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries. George 
Rude, Henry Pelling, G.D.H. Cole and A .E . Musson argued that 
in the eighteenth century the most stable and effective 
forms of labor organization could be created only by highly 
skilled and relatively highly paid workers. These workers 
formed the labor "aristocracy" of the early trade union 
movement. Their narrow sectional and occupational interests 
and methods of organization formed the bases of English 
trade unionism until the late nineteenth century. The 
scarcity value of their skills enabled these workers to 
extract concessions from their employers and their higher 
wages allowed them to contribute to box clubs and friendly 
societies. These mutual benefit societies flourished among 
the skilled artisans; in 1797 Frederick Morton Eden wrote 
that "since the commencement of the present century friendly
4
societies have gradually extended to most parts of Great
Britain." In 1793, Parliament recognized them by Rose's
Friendly Societies Act, which gave them legal status and
protected their funds. The ostensible function of friendly
societies was to insure their members against the
economically detrimental effects of sickness and
unemployment. However, most also had industrial objectives:
limiting the number of workers engaged in a particular
trade, enforcing the rules of apprenticeship, and promoting
policies to prevent local unemployment from forcing down
wages. The dividing line between friendly societies and
illegal labor combinations remained unclear, and workers
combining for wage-bargaining purposes could use the
organization and discipline of a friendly society as a legal
disguise for their activities. The ranks of the skilled
artisans also included a higher proportion of literate
workers who could organize, publicize, petition and oversee
the accounts of their mutual benefit societies. Methods
such as an organized strike or peaceful petitioning for
redress of grievances were more readily undertaken by those
workers bound by the common professional interests of a
particular trade or by those more able to find support among
7the local magistrates or in Parliament.
The Tyneside collier seamen do not fit neatly into this 
definition of the eighteenth ' century labor aristocracy. 
Although they were highly skilled workers who could use
5
their expertise to gain concessions from the shipowners in 
labor disputes, they were not highly paid workers. Their 
wages in 17 92 were among the lowest paid at Tyneside. The 
demands of their trade did not require a high degree of 
literacy as compared to other skilled artisans and 
craftsmen. The early development of collier seamen's trade 
unionism and the success they achieved in labor disputes 
were all the more anomalous because they did not formalize 
or legitimize their organization into a friendly society 
until 1798 .8
Despite these apparent discrepancies, the Tyneside
collier seamen had certain distinct advantages over other
laborers which help to explain their successful trade
unionism. These merchant seamen enjoyed a distinctive
status, both locally and nationally, which resulted from the
vital function they performed in the sea-borne coal trade.
Labor unrest among them invariably had national implications
through its effects on the fuel supply of the Metropolis. In
addition, the merchant service's inextricable link to the
Royal Navy as the nursery of British seamen elevated the
status of all seamen in the popular mind. Jack Tar, who
manned the wooden walls of Britain's senior service, was a
popular hero in wartime and the merchant seamen shared in
9his glory during the eighteenth century. On the local 
level, the collier seamen's status was bolstered by their 
position within the Tyneside maritime community, which
provided a substantial basis of support for their trade 
union activities.
The Webbs provided the clearest and most concise 
definition of a trade union as "a continuous association of 
wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the 
condition of their employment" and protecting their standard 
of living through organized resist a n c e . ^  With a slight 
variation, this definition describes the labor organization 
created by the Tyneside collier in the late eighteenth 
century. Their organization can not be considered a 
continuous association because the seamen united only 
sporadically and on an ad hoc basis to resolve specific and 
immediate grievances. Yet the example of the collier seamen 
clearly indicates that the spirit, if not the ultimate form, 
of defensive trade unionism predated the repeal of the 
Combination Acts by half a century. Although formal labor 
unions were illegal under English staute and common law as 
combinations in restraint of trade, these merchant seamen 
united repeatedly to defend their interests in wage and 
other labor disputes. Using established methods of 
organization and effective, but unofficial, leadership,^ 
the seamen were able to bring pressure to bear against the 
important local Tyneside coal and shipping interests in 
1768, 1775, 1777 and 1785.
From the emergency mobilization of the Royal Navy 
during the Nootka Sound incident of 17 90 to the passage of
7
the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, the decade of the 
1790s was particularly critical in the further development 
of collier seamen's trade unionism. During this period the 
seamen were subjected to a rising cost of living which was 
exacerbated by the pressures of wartime inflation and food 
shortages. Revolution abroad and the fear of domestic 
political discontent stiffened attitudes against any 
manifestation of popular disturbance, including labor 
strikes, which might disguise seditious activities. After 
1793, war with France brought to the seamen the recurring 
threat of impressment into the Royal Navy, with its 
attendant loss of liberty and low wages. The methods 
developed by the collier seamen, which had proved remarkably 
successful in earlier labor disputes, were put to the test 
as the seamen found themselves increasingly subjected to 
external events and forces over which they had little or no 
control.
8
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CHAPTER ONE
A DISPOSITION TO RIOT
On 5 November 1792, the Home Office received a letter
from Rowland Burdon, MP for the county of Durham, describing
a strike for higher wages by the collier seamen of Shields.1
The next day a second letter arrived from North Shields
shipowner Thomas Powditch which described in more detail the
activities of the collier seamen and the "extreemly [sic]
2alarming" situation in the port. This strike, whxch 
paralyzed the seaborne coal trade from mid-October to 
mid-November, epitomized the development of the seamen's 
attitudes and methods of defensive trade unionism during the 
1790s.
According to an Act of Parliament, the collier seamen 
in 1792 were paid a flat rate of 50s. per London voyage 
regardless of the time of the year, the length of the 
voyage, the price of coal in London or the cost of living. 
Even if a seaman could find steady employment in the collier 
fleet, which was unlikely given the economic vagaries of the 
coal trade and the many delays in shipping from the Tyne, 
this wage rate amounted to only about £20 per year. During 
the eighteenth century, this was the minimum subsistence 
level for a single male but a family could not be supported 
on less than £30 or £40 per year. This meant that the 
collier seamen were not highly paid workers by contemporary
10
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standards or that work in the collier fleet was seasonal
employment necessarily supplemented by other sources of 
3income.
By the late summer of 1792, the seamen were threatened
with a decline in their standard of living because of rising 
4food prices. As one observer noted, "the Wages of the
seamen of this Port have not been encreased [sic] for a
Considerable time back since which the price of every
5article of living has encreased [sic] very much." The price
of grain, by which the cost of living in the eighteenth
century was measured, had been decreasing. The 1792
harvest, however, was deficient due to the wetness of the
summer months and grain prices began to rise. The seamen's
peacetime wages were not governed by the free market economy
of supply and demand nor were they adjusted for the cost of
living. With the approach of winter, the seamen faced the
prospect of having their stable wages applied to the
frequently longer voyages of the winter season. They were
determined to oppose any situation which threatened their
rising expectations and diminished what they regarded as the
proper standard of living for men of their acknowledged
6abilities and responsibilities.
The seamen demanded that the shipowners pay £3 per 
London voyage during the six winter months of November to
7April. In the eighteenth century it was not uncommon for 
wages to vary by season; for the collier seamen this demand
12
could be justified by the greater hazards and longer
duration of winter voyages. Wages also varied with the
frequency of employment. Winter voyages were notoriously
inconstant because of weather., wind and sea conditions and
8often the seamen faced periods of enforced idleness.
The strike of 1792 was preceded by
a long continuance of Easterly wind [which] had 
detained the Ships in this port untill [sic] a 
large fleet (about 400 sail) had accumulated, on 
[the] appearence [sic] of a change of Wind from 
the East to the Westward (which is a fair wind for 
Ships to proceed to Sea) the seamen discover'd a 
disposition to Riot, . . . [and] assembled in
great numbers in different parts of the Towns of 
N forth] . . . [and] South g Shields, and in boats
upon the River Tyne. . . .
The seamen removed the crews, mates and carpenters from all 
vessels detained in the harbor and persuaded or coerced 
those on ships newly arriving at the Tyne to join the 
s t r i k e . ^  The disciplinary committees systematically 
proceeded
in boats . . . [from] Ship to Ship, and compelled 
the reluctant or willing Seamen and Officers of 
every Ship in [the] harbour to leave their 
Ships . . . [and] join the mob, by tjijls means a 
great number of Seamen were collected.
The collier crews were forced to give up their notes— their 
individual contracts with the shipmaster. Without these 
notes the sailors could not claim their wages at the end of 
the voyage. The strikers also confiscated the articles of 
agreement, the contracts between the shipmasters and owners, 
without which the masters could not claim their wages. To
13
preclude verbal agreements between the shipowners, masters
and crews, the strikers had to prevent ships from leaving 
12the harbor. To do this, they
divided themselves into Parties (forming two or 
more watches,) under chiefs, and took possession 
of the Port, by stationing a Body of Seamen under 
one of these Chiefs at the entrance of the harbour 
on each side of the River where it is very narrow, 
to prevent any Ships from proceeding to Sea in 
[the] Nights.
The sails of the ships recently arrived from London were
taken away from them and their seamen were removed unless
14the shipowners agreed to the strikers' demands.
The strikers' disciplinary committees maintained strict
control over their proceedings and created, at least in
appearance,-a united opposition. Burdon predicted that "the
Sailors will become a considerable body under exact
15regulations of their own." The Times reported that
"watches are kept with regularity, passwords are
established; the streets paraded, traitors punished, and not
a ship suffered to leave the harbor. . . . The strikers
observed the greatest order and regularity— they 
paraded the streets at night, and would not suffer 
any apprentice to be on shore after eight o'clock 
lest disorders committed by these boys might be 
imputed to them: if they met a group of shipowners 
and their wives, with servants and lanthorns, the 
order was immediately given 'cj-^ar the way sailors 
for the ladies and gentlemen.'
Their methods were both successful and long-lasting. As 
late as 15 November when Captain Alexander Cochrane arrived 
at Shields, he found "every thing on Shore perfectly Quiet
14
[and] the seamen every where behaving with the utmost degree
1 8of Civility and Regularity. . . . "
Despite the actions of the disciplinary committees,
compliance with the strikers' goals and methods was never
complete or always voluntary. In order to impose their
authority, or at least enlist the passive acquiescence of 
19the seamen, the committees dealt harshly with those who
did not support the strike or failed to abide by its
regulations. Some of those who complied did so out of fear
for their personal safety. Powditch reported that support
for the strike was not unanimous among the seamen and that
when separately applied to, acknowledged 
themselves satisfied with [the] wages [50s.] they 
agreed for, and in excuse for their leaving [the] 
Ships, and becoming a part of [the] mob, said they 
were obliged to do so, or would be illtreated
by the rest of [the] Seamen.
Shipowner Joseph Bulmer admitted that the seamen "do no
personal harm to any Individual that I know of except their
21own Body, and with them they are extreme [sic] severe." So
strict was the committees' control that
scarcely any one dares speak his sentiments 
openly, and a sharp look out is kept after two 
persons who have; and because one of them hac^^3 
ship about to sail, an overhaul was made of it.
Violence against members of their own ranks took the
form of customary punishments under an unwritten code of 
23conduct. The Times reported that the strikers' "outrageous 
cruelties . . . exceed every thing of the kind experienced
15
on any similar occasion, and are of such a nature as would
24disgrace any set of men." On a few occasions the
transgressors were forced to "ride the stang" by being
25carried, through Shields on a pole. Local observers
described the other "shocking" methods by which discipline
was enforced. Marching men naked through the streets with
halters around their necks was "no uncommon sight,"
especially in North Shields. This was the strikers'
punishment for some seamen who "discovered a reluctance to
2 6comply with their proceedings." A roll was called
regularly "and the absent punished according to their
laws." In South Shields, three sailors, "who had not been
quite punctual at their Meetings," were forced to walk naked
through the streets and marketplace of the town. This
punishment was not confined to seamen; at least one
27shipmaster also suffered the same ignominy.
The seamen did not commit violent excesses against
persons or property, although they certainly had the power
to do so. There is no evidence of attacks on the shipowners
or their houses. Although the seamen threatened to burn the
ships of those owners who refused to agree to their
2 8demands, this threat was not carried out. However, those 
who tried to run the blockade were dealt with severely by 
the strikers. Nehemiah Blagdon's ship Mary attempted to 
sail from the harbor on 7 November. Its crew had signed
their notes for the usual wage of 50s., although this had
16
been forbidden by the strike committees. Thirty of the
strikers boarded the ship while under sail, let go the
topsail and forced the Mary to drop anchor. The strikers
demanded the ship's articles, which had been signed by the
crew. They tore the articles out of the log book, took them
ashore and destroyed them. When Blagdon attempted to run
the blockade again, the watch reboarded the ship and
29confiscated the entire log book.
To settle the strike peacefully and successfully, the
seamen needed a sympathetic person of integrity and
30influence to present their grievances to the shipowners.
This was Captain Leckey of H.M.S. Racehorse, a sloop which
arrived at the Tyne in late October. Leckey conducted talks
with the representatives of the seamen and became "a kind of
a mediator" between them and the shipowners. The strikers
asked for Leckey's assistance in formulating and submitting
a petition of their grievances to the Lords of the
Admiralty, on whose decision the seamen promised to abide.
How Leckey came to perform this role was unclear even to the
shipowners and his involvement in finding a peaceful
resolution to the strike earned him the emnity of the more
31obdurate shipowners. Although Powditch acknowledged that
Leckey was "accuated by the best of motives," his
interference was also believed to be "highly improper" 
because it served only to confirm the opinion "that
Government is a fraid [sic] of provoking the lower class of
17
3 2People." Leckey denied his partiality toward the seamen's
cause, claiming "that the Ship Owners think that I am more
the sailors [sic] friend than theirs; what foundation they
have for it I know not; but they are most egregiously
• 33mistaken." Leckey believed the seamen's demands were
unreasonable, but he had "not been able to convince them
they are too exhorbitant in their demands" and he refused to
34sign their petition. This belief, however, did not prevent 
Leckey from intervening to end the strike peacefully.
At the beginning of the strike, the shipowners
underestimated both the intelligence and the determination 
of the strikers. This miscalculation was clearly evident in
the resolutions passed at a general meeting of the
3 5shipowners at the Newcastle Trinity House on 24 October.
Also present were Burdon, Charles Brandling, MP for the
county of Northumberland, James Rudman, the mayor of
Newcastle, and Nathaniel Clayton, the town clerk. The
shipowners agreed that
it is fair and reasonable that the Sailors should 
receive a proper Satisfaction for the Toil and 
Dangers of the Service they perform, but 
extravagent Wages only produce Mischief to the
Sailors themselves, by drawing to the Port a
greater Number of Men than can find Employment and 
by inducing more Persons to follow the Sea than 
the Trade of the Kingdom can receive; besides, 
such Mages cannot, in the Nature of Things, last 
long.
The shipowners claimed that they would have considered a
wage increase "had not the Sailors of this Port taken
18
illegal Measures," but now they could not acquiesce to the 
strikers' demands without incurring "the Penalty of the Law, 
as Encouragers of Tumult and Disorder. . . ." The owners
insisted that the seamen return to their ships and their 
proper position of obedience in exchange for £3 per London 
voyage for the months of November to February. This offer 
was rejected "with contempt" by the seamen who assumed "a 
more dareing [sic] appearance" and remained insistent on 
their original demand of £3 per voyage from November to 
April.37
The seamen continued to remove the crews from ships
recently arrived from London and "to occupy the Entrance of
the Harbour permitting no Ships to sail in the Night, and
only those during the day which had complied with their
3 8demands. . . . "  In consequence of this and the rejection of
the shipowners' offer, the South Shields Committee, which
consisted of twenty-one shipowners appointed at the 24
October meeting, met again at the Trinity House. Nothing was
resolved except to call another general meeting of
39shipowners on 31 October.
No magistrate or other civil official attended the 31 
October meeting at the Trinity House. Leckey advocated a 
policy of conciliation and a small majority of the 
shipowners agreed as it was "impossible for the Trade to 
bear" the further closure of the port. The unprotected 
state of the harbor induced these shipowners to offer
19
concessions to restore peace and order. The owners 
delegated their representatives to meet with Rudman, Clayton 
and the strikers' representatives to settle the strike by 
offering the terms the seamen demanded. Leckey described 
the offer as "generous," but the shipowners cautioned that 
the concessions arose "from Motives of Humanity only." The 
owners' offer was presented to a deputation of the seamen 
aboard the Racehorse the next day. Leckey and Clayton were 
also present, but Rudman did not attend. Here the strikers 
rejected the owners' offer which fulfilled their original 
demand of £3 per winter v o y a g e . ^
At the beginning of November, there was no indication
that the strikers' control over the port was weakening.
41They remained in an excellent bargaining position and,
42"intoxicated with a power too long enjoyed," they used 
this opportunity to extend their terms. The seamen now 
demanded four guineas per winter voyage.
At the outset, the shipowners were unwilling to comply 
with these "unreasonable Demands." However, the crowded 
condition of the harbor, "the fear from the mob, the 
temptation of a fair wind, the great demand for coals in 
London, and no Support in view" from the local authorities 
induced some of the shipowners to accede to these new 
demands. The seamen distinguished.their ships by a jack at 
the masthead and their crews were permitted onboard. These 
ships were allowed to proceed to sea by day "amidst the
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4 3acclamations . . . [and] hurras of the mob." The strikers
"made a point to Board all the Ships that sail'd to satisfy
themselves that the Crews had not broke [sic] through the
4 4General Agreement . . . until the Wages is [sic] settled."
For the "few spirited men" who refused to acquiesce to
the strikers' demands, the absence of this jack on their
ships "had a wonderful effect by pointing out both the
persons and property of [the] persons, who were as they
pleased to call them [the] Seamen's Enemys [sic]." These
shipowners, including Thomas Powditch, Joseph Bulmer and
Nicholas Fairies, would not submit to coercion by their
employees. Powditch was a self-described man "of more
spirit than prudence" which made him "in some degree
obnoxious to the Mob. . . . "  Addressing the shipowners at
their 31 October meeting, Powditch argued that the
"humiliating offer" of £3 per voyage made by "the trembling
Shipowners" was "reprehensible." The offer, although
"sanctioned by the presence of Members of Parliament!,] the
Magistrates of the Corporation!,] the Town Clerk and other
Persons of importance" (none of whom attended the meeting),
succeeded only in increasing the insolence of the strikers
and encouraging them to further their demands. Raising the
seamen's wages
will not lessen but increase the Evil, as the high 
wages given at neighbouring Ports are the occasion 
of many Seamen coming to this Place at this Season 
who finding all the births [sic] occupied have no 
other recourse but in creating confusion. . . .
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In Powditich's opinion, the shipowners had but two options, 
either
to encourage future riots by making concessions to 
the present rioters, or to come forward like men 
concious [sic] of living under a mild but 
effective Government and take such steps as 
deliberate wisdom shall point out to suppress the 
present and discourage future mobs.
Instead of negotiation, Powditch recommended offering
45rewards to "bring the delinquents to Justice."
The local civil authorities' unwillingness or
incapacity to intervene against the seamen meant that the
harbor facilities and private property at the port were
entirely unprotected from the activities of the strikers.
Although the use of coercive force was "much to be dreaded,"
local observers assured the Home Office that it was "the
earnest wish of all the people here to have the Mob 
46quelled." The inadequacy of the local civil forces meant
that the clumsy weapon of military and naval force was often
the only effective means of controlling large disturbances.
The Home Office was accustomed to dealing with provincial
magistrates who requested military assistance, even on the
47slightest grounds.
Because of the bureaucratic and jurisdictional
48limtitations of the Home Office, Permanent Undersecretary 
of State Evan Nepean had no choice but to accept the 
recommendations of local observers at Tyneside as to the 
number of troops and naval vessels necessary to control the
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4 9strike. The seamen were not to be confronted easily and 
Rudman believed that peace and order could be restored only 
by the 'threat of coercive measures. He warned that the 
strikers'
numbers and appearance of determined resolution 
with which they conduct themselves make it 
absolutely necessary that the force to be used 
should be s Ôq considerable as to leave no Hope of 
Resistance.
If the requisite force were not provided, Bulmer predicted
that the seamen's numbers would increase to three thousand
within a few days. He informed the Home Office that the 160
or 170 public houses in South Shields could accomodate an
average of three soldiers each and he urged Burdon to use
his influence to obtain the construction of a barracks to
quarter troops permanently at the p o r t . ^  Burdon suggested
that it would be "highly proper" that a sloop or frigate "of
as much force as the harbour will admit" with "mooring
chains in case of riot to prevent any possibility of cutting
her adrift" be permanently stationed at Shields. In
addition, he requested that "a proper portion" of troops be
quartered in Shields, a request seconded by the Bishop of 
52Durham.
The government responded immediately to these 
suggestions and requests on 5 November by obtaining an order 
from the War Office directing three companies of the 57th 
Regiment of dragoons at Tynemouth Barracks to South Shields. 
Major Thompson was given command of the detachment and was
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authorized to draw more dragoons from Tynemouth Barracks if
necessary. Thompson was also informed that two troops of
dragoons from York could be ordered to Shields as well.55
The commanding officer at York was to be prepared to
dispatch himself and his remaining two troops if further aid 
54were needed. In addition, the Martin sloop of war, with
eighteen guns, was ordered to the Tyne to reinforce the
55eighteen gun Racehorse already there. By taking these
measures, the government assured the civil authorities that 
"every necessary Step has been taken" to assist them "before 
any serious mischief shall take place."5®
On 8 November, Rudman informed the Home Office of the 
"proper measures" which had been adopted by the local 
authorities. In response to the Blagdon incident, a general 
meeting of the magistrates of Durham, Northumberland and 
Newcastle and Leckey and Thompson was held in the mayor's 
chambers in Newcastle. At this meeting it was divulged that 
the magistrates, along with the shipowners of South Shields, 
agreed that dividing the forces at Tynemouth Barracks by 
sending three companies of the 57th Regiment to South 
Shields had weakened it considerably. By Major Thompson's 
account, after deducting those troops of the regiment at 
Sunderland, Hartlepool and Newcastle, fewer than 150 
remained at Tynemouth Barracks. In consequence of this 
revelation, Thompson had "been prevailed upon" not to 
separate the troops under his command because "there would
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not be a competent number for each side of the water, if
they were called upon to act. . . ." Burdon explained that
his original request for "a proper portion" of troops was
intended to mean those from outside the area, "for by
stating that North Shields was sufficiently protected by the
Barracks, I thought it wou'd be understood that the troops
57were well-stationed already." The magistrates unanimously
concluded that the military and naval forces available, even
with the addition of the Martin which had not yet arrived at
the Tyne, were still insufficient. Such an inadequate
display of force would serve only to provoke the strikers
without having the power to suppress- them. As a result of
this determination, Rudman and Burdon requested the
detachment of troops from York, three hundred of whom "might
be quarter'd commodiously at Shields withhout being billeted
or intermixed with the inhabitants," and they requested that
all forces be given discretionary orders which could be
5 8deviated from in an emergency.
Acting Home Secretary Lord William Grenville was
hostile to both the strikers and the magistrates for failing
to suppress them. It would be only "by a proper Exertion on
the part of the Magistracy [that] further mischiefs may be
prevented, [and] a stop put to the Spirit of Combination
59which appears to have prevailed." Grenville was
"apprehensive" that additional naval and military forces 
would be necessary to end- the strike. He ordered Captain
25
Cochrane and the twenty-eight gun Hind frigate to proceed
immediately to the Tyne, while the Drake sloop and the Niger
frigate sailed there from Portsmouth on 9 and 14 November
respectively. Together with the Racehorse and the Martin
they would form "a respectable force" and because the
Martin, Hind, Niger and Drake had detachments of marines
aboard, they would be "capable of affording effective
Assistance" to the civil authorities. By 16 November, a
local observer could report that Shields was "well off in a
naval force to protect our p r o p e r t y . B e c a u s e  there was no
infantry closer to Shields than that at Edinburgh, Lord Adam
Gordon, the commander-in-chief in Scotland, was notified to
comply with any requisition for troops from the Newcastle
magistrates by detaching immediately as many soldiers as
61could be spared.
Thus by mid-November the government also made available 
to the civil authorities the five companies of the 57th
Regiment of dragoons at Tynemouth Barracks, Sunderland, 
Hartlepool and Newcastle, the four troops of dragoons at
York and the infantry at Edinburgh. The government was 
forced to rely on the information and recommendations 
provided by the local authorities as to how these forces 
were to be used. Because Major Thompson could "have no 
other object in view, than that of rendering himself 
useful," he would have to be guided by the mayor and 
magistrates of Newcastle in the distribution of his troops.
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Rudman was the "best Judge" of the situation at Shields and
further naval and military assistance could be obtained if
the "due consideration" of the local officials deemed the
6 2available forces insufficient. To assist the local
authorities, on 13 November the Home Office dispatched
Assistant Adjutant General Colonel Oliver Delancey to the
Tyne to take command of the troops there. Nepean warned
Delancey that the Tyneside authorities believed that the
military forces available were insufficient. Therefore,
Delancey was directed that
upon your making known to the Magistrates the 
occasion of your arrival, and after collecting 
their Sentiments, and those of any other Persons 
you may find it prudent to consult, you will 
inform me [Nepean] as speedily as possible 
of . . . the probability of your being enabled 
with the Force which will be with you effectively 
to assist the civil magistrates. . . .  If you 
shall be satisfied that you are in a situation to 
act with effect, you will then acquaint the 
Magistrates that such is your opinion, and that 
you are ready with the King's troops under your 
command to do your duty if called upon. But you 
will as far as possible avoid exposing Yourself, 
except on the most urgent necessity to any hazard 
of an ineffectual attempt.
Delancey was also informed that another frigate with a
detachment of marines aboard was prepared to sail from
Spithead but that its departure would be delayed until
Delancey notified the Home Office as "to the probability of
the Force already ordered being equal to the performance of
6 3any Service which circumstances may be likely to require."
The magistrates probably hoped that the strike could be
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64settled peacefully without resorting to repressive force.
On 8 November, a meeting of the magistrates of Newcastle, 
Durham and Northumberland, with the concurrence of the naval 
and military officers present, deputed Rowland Burdon to 
make another attempt at mediation— the first since the 
strikers rejected the shipowners' offer aboard the Racehorse 
a week earlier. Burdon was the obvious choice for this 
duty. He was well known among the coal and shipping 
interests and had local popularity among all the classes at 
Tyneside. At the conclusion of this strike, The Times, which 
was generally critical of the inactivity of the magistrates, 
would proclaim that the public was "very much indebted" to 
Burdon for taking "a very active part" in settling the 
dispute. Burdon continued playing a role in settling 
disturbances at Tyneside for more than forty years.
By 13 November, the strikers "gave way a little in
their demands" and submitted to Burdon's offer of
mediation. Burdon optimistically informed the Home Office
that as a result of these changes, "we are in afair [sic]
way of terminating the Riot" and that Shields would be
6 6restored to a "State of Security" by the next day.
Despite Burdon's attempts at a conciliatory settlement, 
some of the shipowners remained intransigent. A "numerous 
and respectable" general meeting of these shipowners was 
held in South Shields on 13 November. This meeting, under 
the chairmanship of Bulmer, resolved that the strikers
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should no longer be allowed to assemble, keep illegal
watches, board any ship, prevent ships from sailing or
punish any of the seamen. All mates and carpenters were
ordered to return to their ships immediately, where they
would be given provisions as soon as they were shipped and
doing their duty. The owners decided that the terms agreed
upon at the 31 October meeting, offering £3 per London
voyage during the six winter months and the usual 50s. for
the six summer months, were "as high as is in [the seamen's]
Interest to receive" and that the crews' notes for these
wages would be signed according to an Act of Parliament. The
owners' resolutions were to be presented to the Newcastle
magistracy and the Home Office and would be published. The
shipowners believed that the impasse would continue "untill
[sic] Government shall cause the Laws to be respected." To
this end, a deputation of shipowners was to request the
cooperation of the Newcastle magistrates in restoring the
peace of the port, while the Northumberland magistracy would
"also be requested to keep the Peace in their respective
6 7Jurisdictions as unlawful assemblies now exist." These 
resolutions forced Burdon to concede that the shipowners 
refused to accept the seamen's terms. Consequently, the 
strike remained unsettled, "tho the Sailors keep the peace 
for the present." Although Burdon remained hopeful that 
"the matter may be adjusted without coming to extremity," 
Major Thompson sent an express for four more troops of horse
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C. Q
to be sent as far as Durham.
After Burdon1s first attempt at reconciling the.
strikers and shipowners failed, he detected a change in the
seamen's behavior. This he attributed as much to the
arrival of the Hind frigate on 15 November as to "the speedy
and effectual intervention of Government of [which] the
6 9People here seem very sensible." With the arrival of the
Hind, Captain Cochrane became the senior naval officer at
Shields. Cochrane began his career in the merchant service
and had a reputation for progressive and humanitarian
reforms at the Leith Station--a reputation among seamen that
helped in his participation in the settlement of the
strike. Despite being diverted from his anti-smuggling
duties at the Leith Station, the fact that the Hind was
badly in need of a re-fit after it grounded on the bar in
the Tyne harbor and that Cochrane had orders to proceed to
Sheerness as soon as possible, his desire to end the strike
quickly did not mean a resolution by force. Instead,
Cochrane used his influence among the seamen to support
7 0Burdon's attempts at mediation.
By this time, the strikers also learned that the Lords
of the Admiralty refused to consider their petition. The
Admiralty informed Leckey that the petition would not be
acted upon because it was unsigned and undated and,
moreover, "my Lords do not think themselves competent to
71interfere therein. . . . "  On 19 November, three shipowners
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and masters, including Powditch, provided information under
oath that "a most dangerous Riot" existed and that the
seamen "have for many Weeks past violently and by force
prevented the Ships [from] sailing" by usurping "the Control
72and Government of the said port. . . . "  Lodging this 
information of a riot with the magistrates now compelled
them to take action against the strikers.
Despite this turn of events, Burdon continued to use
Cochrane's influence to gain some concessions from the 
shipowners by which he could again meet with the seamen. 
Burdon proposed to present Parliament with a statement of 
the situation at Shields because he believed it would be 
necessary
to subject the state of this Port to the
consideration of [Parliament] in the ensuing 
Sessions, as I am certain that without the means 
of establishing a rate of Wages here from time to 
time We shall perpetually be subject to these 
scenes of riot and disturbance.
To accomplish this, Burdon proposed that Parliament pass a 
bill whereby the seamen's wages could be equitably adjusted 
as circumstances required. If the owners would agree to pay 
£3 per London voyage until Lady Day (25 March), Burdon would 
try to create a board of shipowners and seamen to fix 
annually the rate of wages. Burdon believed he could obtain 
such legislation to take effect on or before 31 May 1793. In 
addition, the articles drawn up by Burdon at Clifford's Fort 
would henceforth serve as the articles for the port of the
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Tyne. On 17 November, Burdon had "an interview" with the
strikers to discuss these terms which he proposed to present
to the shipowners. The seamen promised Burdon and Leckey
that they would accept these terms, leaving it up to the
73shipowners to end the strike.
On the afternoon of 19 November, "a respectable Number"
of shipowners met in Shields and agreed to Burdon1s
proposals. The owners told him that these were "the
Ultimate Terms" the seamen could expect and that the owners
would inform the magistrates "if the Sailors depart from
their Word." Later that day, a prolonged conference between
Burdon and the strike leaders was held in Shields. Burdon
told the seamen that if his proposals were not accepted by
them, the civil authorities would have no choice but to end
the strike forcibly. The seamen assured Burdon that they
still agreed to his terms. The results of this meeting were
anxiously awaited by a crowd of seamen outside and, upon
hearing of the strike's peaceful resolution, "the Sailors
74cheered the Ship Owners." The next day, Cochrane informed 
the Home Office that the shipowners and seamen had reached 
an agreement to end the strike but he also suggested that a
frigate with 150 marines aboard be detained at Shields until
75peace was permanently restored. Burdon also remaxned 
cautious because "till the Wind and Tide will admit of the
Experiment, I can only judge by the words arid
7 6Resolutions. . . ." The Newcastle magistrates agreed to
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meet at Shields on 21 November to protect the ships ready to
sail from being boarded or hindered by the seamen. This
precaution was unnecessary, however, and the seamen returned
to duty without incident. The day after the agreement was
reached, twenty-seven loaded ships sailed from the port
77without interference from the strikers.
Burdon’s plan for a regulatory board to determine
seamen's wages was not new. In the aftermath of a labor
dispute during the Nootka Sound incident of 1790, an
anonymous Newcastle shipowner proposed a similar idea
because "until some Plan of this Nature is determined upon,
we shall forever have our Ships and Property at the Mercy
7 8and Caprice of the Sailors." The shipowners of Sunderland,
however, were dubious of Burdon's plan, claiming "that it is
not in the Power of Man to form an Act of Parliament that
79will bind the Seamen." Yet it was often the shipowners who
refused to honor concessions once the threat of a strike 
8 0disappeared. Burdon's plan ultimately failed to win
parliamentary approval for just this reason— his proposal
was opposed by the powerful Tyneside shipping interests and
his idea for a regulatory wage board consisting of both
81seamen and shipowners was not implemented.
As long as trade unions remained local, narrow in 
occupational interests and legally proscribed, workers like 
the collier seamen could achieve only short-lived and 
limited results in labor disputes. The weakness of labor
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groups organized only on an ad hoc and temporary basis 
allowed employers to renege on labor agreements after the 
conclusion of strikes. These repeated breaches of faith on 
the part of the shipowners bred disillusionment and 
disaffection among the seamen in the period after the 
Napoleonic War. This factor contributed to the further 
deterioration of the traditionally mutual relationship 
between the - magistrates, shipowners and seamen which began 
in the 1790s and became a marked feature of Tyneside labor 
relations in the 1830s. This erosion resulted in attitudes 
of sustained economic hostility and competition and the 
eventual permanent ranging of employers and workers in
opposite camps which made impossible a continuation of the
8 2moderation displayed by the collier seamen in the 1790s.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ENERGY AND ORDER OF A SYSTEM
In the strike of 1792, the collier seamen brought the
coastal and coal shipping trades to a halt and their
organization enabled them essentially to control the port of
the Tyne for several weeks. These methods were already a
tradition in Tyneside labor disputes and would remain so
until the early nineteenth century.'*' The seamen's ability to
do this demonstrated the moderation and effectiveness of
their leadership and the severe limitations of local
government in controlling large disturbances in the
eighteenth century.
Despite the rapid growth of Tyneside, the arrangements
for the maintenance of public order remained archaic and
inadequate. These communities were very turbulent places
and it was rare for a year or two to pass without some
2manifestation of public disturbance. Even in the late
eighteenth century the North was still "too prone to
outrage" and "notorious for its continuing lawlessness and 
3insecurity." Disturbances among the pitmen and keelmen were
endemic and the ship-carpenters were
rough, lawless, fiery-tempered men and youths, 
foremost in revelry, row, and riot, or, what was 
equally dreaded, public jubilation,— these were 
the terror of the populace and th^ irresolvable 
difficulty of the town authorities.
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Shipowner Thomas Powditch complained that the inability of 
the local magistrates to maintain order was a recurring 
problem at Tyneside and was not new in 1792. According to 
him,
the successful Riots of thirty years are 
sufficient encouragement for . . . [the seamen] to
continue the practice, thirty years have ' the 
Inhabitants of N[orth] and S[outh] Shields been 
under the dominion of Mobs. Thirty years has the 
River Tyne been the Theatre of their depredations 
and the place of their security— and Thirty years 
has the Magistracy of that district been disgraced 
by their . . . incapacity to preserve the peace of
the Port.
The Corporation of Newcastle's magistrates claimed, and 
were allowed to possess, exclusive jurisdiction over the 
entire tidal length of the Tyne from seven miles above 
Newcastle to ten miles below it, including the harbor at 
Shields. The Newcastle magistrates therefore played an 
important role in any disturbance affecting the Tyne or the 
harbor, which was the center of disputes involving the 
collier seamen. This arrangement also meant that North 
Shields (including Tynemouth) with a population of 13,000 
and South Shields with 11,000 inhabitants in 1801 had no 
resident magistrates of their own. If force were used to 
quell a disturbance at the harbor, there was no magistrate 
within several miles of Shields to read the Riot Act or to 
authorize the billeting of troops. Although the Tyne 
bordered Durham and Northumberland, the magistrates of these 
counties had no authority to act on the river. It was not
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unusual, however, for the magistrates of Newcastle to meet 
with those of Durham and Northumberland during times of 
serious trouble to coordinate activities for the restoration 
of order.^
In the eighteenth century, labor strikes had not yet
been legally distinguished from riots. The supression of
these disturbances comprised nearly the entire regulative
7reponsibility of the local authorities. The duty of a
magistrate was to appear even on the rumor of a riot or
strike and to disperse it by reading the Riot Act. Such
"timely interference" by the civil authorities could prevent
8a disturbance from getting out of control. Rowland Burdon,
a member of Parliament who was also a magistrate for the
county of Durham,
conceived that the duty of Magistrates wou'd have 
carried them to the Spot on the rumour of a Riot, 
if such thing was found to exist the Magistrate 
[sic] wou'd have recorded it [and] have proceeded 
to quel [sic] it.
In the case of the collier seamen's strike of 1792, however, 
such action was not "thought proper." Any one of the 
magistrates had the power to intervene on his own but 
collectively they had not "thought the time had come to shew
themselves" and Burdon continued "to act under the
9determination of the majority" by not intervenxng.
The obdurate shipowners attributed the reluctance of 
the Newcastle magistrates to intervene to a policy of 
intentional neglect. Newcastle's "unjust privileges and
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chartered rights"1  ̂ had been a point of contention and a
source of animosity between the Corporation and the towns
within its jurisdiction for several centuries and would
remain so until the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. The
administrative problems created by the jurisdictional
arrangements on the Tyne were exacerbated by the rapid
growth of the towns downriver and the growing importance of
the coal and shipping trades in the eighteenth century. The
increased wealth and population of these communities were
achieved only at the expense of the Corporation of
Newcastle.'*''*' Shipowner Joseph Bulmer claimed that South
Shields was "quite neglected" by the Corporation despite its
responsibilities on the Tyne. Bulmer attributed this neglect
to jealousy on the part of the Corporation toward the new
and thriving towns. North and South Shields
contain near forty thousand Inhabit[ants] among 
which are many opulent Ship Owners and Merchants, 
we are daily increasing in point of Inhabitants 
and are well situated for Trade having one of the 
best natural Harbours in England, t h o 1 much 
impaired by the ^egligence of the Corporation of 
Newcastle. . . .
Powditch's opinions, which made him "obnoxious to the 
Mob," also made him "no favorite with [the] Magistrates" 
either. He thought "the supiness of the Magistrates very 
reprehensible" and he criticized their inability or 
unwillingness to put down the strike, by force if necessary, 
because they seemed to prefer to humor the seamen rather 
than suppress them. According to Powditch, the experience
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of thirty years of riots on the Tyne convinced the
shipowners
that no reliance could be placed on the 
Magistrates of the River Tyne for the Protection 
of their property or on the County's Magistrates 
for the P r o m o t i o n  of either Persons or 
property. . . .
Bulmer accused the magistrates of being "either diffident of
their power or unwilling to exert it" because they felt
14"little anxiety about this Riot."
Permanent Undersecretary of State Evan Nepean
acknowledged that there had been "some difficulty" in •
procuring the cooperation of the Newcastle magistrates in
15settling the strike. However, from the magistrates' 
perspective, the reasons for their decision not to intervene 
were justifiable. On a practical level, such intervention 
could escalate a peaceful strike into a violent riot. A'' 
riot was a calamity to be avoided even at high cost because 
the resulting social dislocation could disrupt a community 
for years. The magistrates had to live in their community 
and would face possible retribution from the seamen for 
grievances unjustly left unredressed or for using force to
suppress a strike. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
negotiation and conciliation in labor disputes had become a 
major part of the magistrates' duties. In this capacity the 
magistrates sought to encourage the growth of responsible
organizations among both employers and w o r k e r s . ^  The 
Newcastle magistrates' reluctance to intervene on behalf of
47
the shipowners may be partly attributable to the belief that 
the seamen had legitimate economic grievances which required 
peaceful settlement by negotiation rather than by the use of 
coercive force.
Despite the government's build-up of an overwhelming 
naval and military force, the Tyneside magistrates refused 
to use it to coerce the strikers into a settlement.
Although The Times criticized the magistrates because they
17dxd "not seem much inclined to exert the arm of power," 
such force was reluctantly wielded by local authorities and 
then only as a last resort because the order imposed by 
violence could be as calamitous as the disturbance itself. 
Moreover, the use of such force was not an alternative as 
long as the magistrates refused to intervene. Troops could 
not take action against civilians until the Riot Act was 
read and the government refused to issue definitive orders
which would have compelled the local authorities to use the
18available military and naval forces to end the strike. 
Military and naval officers like Captains Leckey and 
Alexander Cochrane in 1792 and Captain Peter Rothe in 1793 
played a crucial role in the resolution of social conflict 
in the eighteenth century. The history of Tyneside labor 
disputes reveals that employers and the civil authorities 
invariably requested the dispatch of troops and naval 
vessels to control the river and intimidate the strikers. 
This internal security duty was perceived by naval and
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military officers as resulting from the ineptitude of
neglect of the local authorities and as a distraction from
their regular duties. Their participation in assisting the
civil authorities was further complicated by the fact that
the powers of naval and military officers in civil
disturbances were vague and ambiguous. Despite their
distaste for anti-riot duty, these officers showed little
inclination to be the passive supporters of obdurate
employers. In fact, they often criticized employers if the
strikers' grievances were legitimate. Neither were these
officers willing to suppress labor disputes quickly by the
use of force. They showed common sense, sagacity and
moderation in their approach to local labor problems and,
naval officers in particular, often functioned as mediators
19between the seamen, shipowners and magistrates.
Although the naval and military forces were not used to
put down the strike, their presence was decisive in the
resolution of the dispute. Until these forces were
increased to overwhelming proportions, the meeting between
the shipowners and strikers were only opportunities to
present their demands, not bargaining sessions, and both
sides refused to give in. As the naval and military forces
increased, the seamen lowered their demands. The presence
of these forces destroyed the discipline necessary to
maintain the strike because the seamen could no longer
20blockade the harbor and control the port.
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On another level, some of the magistrates' reluctance
to intervene must be attributed to the organization and
discipline of the seamen themselves. While the strikers may
have been unlawfully assembled, their behavior was not
riotous and tumultuous as required by definition in the Riot 
21Act. As Burdon explained,
there has been thru the whole of this affair, a
degree of system and order unknown in former
riots, so much so, as to make the Part the
Magistrates, had to act, embarassing and 
difficult.
Thus the magistrates' reluctance was not simply due to
indulgence or indolence but to the fact that the anomalies
of the interpretation and operation of the Riot Act were
confusing and they could not decide whether or not a riot
23was actually occurring.
James Rudman, the mayor of Newcastle and its chief
magistrate, refused to acknowledge the seriousness of the 
strike because, according to Bulmer, "he affects to believe 
a Riot does not exist." While it was "true that Men do not
set fire to the Town, or Ships in the Harbour," Rudman would
not concede that lesser activities were riotous. Even when 
a Newcastle official related the difficulty he had in 
reaching his house in North Shields because of the strike, 
Rudman would not admit the occurrence of a riot. He did not 
attend the shipowners' meeting on 31 October or the 
presentation of their offer to the strikers aboard the 
Racehorse the next day. The shipowners feared they would
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have "much difficulty" in getting Rudman to come to Shields
even on the arrival of a large military force despite the
2 4fact that as mayor he controlled the local militia.
Rudman would not intervene until information of a riot
was lodged with him. The shipowners, however, did "not
appear at all willing to come forward to aid the Civil
Powers in settling these disputes in which they are so
deeply concerned." Rudman complained that the shipowners
could not be prevailed upon to provide such information out
25of "dread of the Vengeance of the Rioters." In fact, it 
was almost impossible for the shipowners to prove an act of 
riot against any of the seamen. The strikers did not appear 
in person when negotiating with shipowners of known 
hostility to their cause but sent strangers unknown to their 
employers instead. These strangers may not have been seamen 
at all which would protect them from later economic
retaliation by the shipowners and their anonymity prevented 
the owners from filing information of a riot with the local 
authorities. It was not until 19 November that three 
shipowners and masters provided such information— but only 
after the build-up of an overwhelming naval and military 
force and just when Burdon's mediation appeared to be
successful in ending the strike peacefully. The seamen thus 
succeeded in using their methods of moderation and effective 
leadership skillfully to avoid major provocations while 
still stopping the seaborne coal trade and thereby prevented
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the local authorities from using the full force of the law 
2 6against them.,
Powditch's assertion that the collier seamen suddenly
27and spontaneously "discover'd a disposition to Riot" was a
typical contemporary interpretation of labor disputes. In
labor historigraphy, these disputes have been defined by
E.J. Hobsbawm and other historians as a primitive mode of
"collective bargaining by riot" in which the workers behaved
as an undisciplined "crowd, not an army." Because formal
labor unions were expressly forbidden by English statute and
common law as illegal combinations in restraint of trade, to
combine openly was a legally precarious undertaking. Early
labor organizations were necessarily secret or disguised and
workers were inclined to a certain furtiveness of behavior.
Neither enlightened, orderly, bureaucratic strikes nor
peaceful petitioning could achieve the workers' demands.
According to this interpretation, the working classes were -
inarticulate and without effective leadership; they could
defend their interests only by means of demonstration,
2 8verbal intimidation and violence. The workers, according 
to Adam Smith,
have always the recourse to the loudest clamour, 
and sometimes to the most shocking violence and 
outrage. They are desperate and act with the 
folly and extravagence of desperate men, who must 
either starve, or frighten their mastery into an 
immediate compliance with their demands.
Strikes, despite all efforts to reduce them to the level of
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bilateral conciliatory negotiation, remained a form of 
industrial warfare. Acts of violence were the rule and 
labor disputes tended to devolve into riots.
The collier seamen's ability to organize themselves, 
even on a temporary or ad hoc basis, did not conform to this 
interpretation of pre-industrial labor disputes. In their 
strike of 1792 the seamen developed an organization which 
worked to their advantage by disciplining members of their 
own ranks and by creating an orderly and united front
against both the shipowners and the magistrates. The
31"determined systematic manner" in which the seamen's 
methods were implemented clearly indicated that the concept
of an executive strike committee predated the development of
32formal and legal trade unionism.
Despite their sophisticated organization, local 
observers continually referred to the seamen as a riotous 
mob. By modern standards, the seamen's activities could be 
called riotous only in that they willfully and successfully 
defied the local authorities. In contemporary parlance, 
however, the term "mob" was applied indiscriminately to any 
unlawful assembly of the lower social orders which engaged 
in riots, strikes or political demonstrations whether or not 
these were accompanied by violence. Such mobs were assumed 
to be the passive instruments of outside parties and to have 
no particular motives or interests of their own. This 
belief necessarily oversimplified the basic causes of
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disturbances because social idealism, political
consciousness or legitimate economic grievances were not
considered to be motivations for crowd actions. Central to
this attitude was an intrinsic fear of conspiracy behind all
manifestations of popular discontent because mobs were
believed to be hired and deliberately used by interests
33"above" or apart from the crowd itself. The seamen's
(
activities in 1792 were described as having "the energy and
34order of a system" and that they conducted themselves
"with much greater Propriety than could be expected from the
3 5Nature of their agitated Situation." To some, the seamen's
numbers, the quality of the declarations they composed and
published and the "apparent Firmness of their Proceedings"
appeared to be regulated "by men of better Education in a
higher Sphere. . .
The seamen made no demands beyond the redress of their
specific economic and occupational grievances and their
strike was completely devoid of any open association with
political objectives. Many local correspondents concurred
in this by reporting that the seamen were striking only to
37increase their wages. Burdon informed the Home Office that
"there seems nothing of a Political nature in this present
matter [and] that the Sailors appear heartily attached to
j 38the Government of the Country." The loyalty of the seamen 
was reaffirmed by a story circulated as being "no less than 
extraordinary." When Captain Duff's Martin sloop became
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stranded on the beach at Shields the sailors, "in great
numbers,"- boarded the ship. These seamen told Duff, "we
know, well enough, by G— , Captain, what you've come about,
but damp [sic] it, we'll save his Majesty's ship for all
that" and they extricated the Martin from its predicament.
As The York Courant proclaimed, "no class of Men but British
39Tars could have acted so generously."
However, when the shipowners capitulated to the
original demand of £3 per voyage on 31 October, the strikers
refused the offer and raised their demand to four guineas.
This action led some to suspect that the true motivations
behind the seamen's discontent was more ominous than a
40simple desire to increase their wages.
Throughout 1792 and 1793 reports of industrial
disorders and provision shortages suggested that widespread
and dangerous disaffection existed among large segments of
the lower classes. It appeared that this discontent,
although arising ultimately from specific economic or social
grievances, was being transformed by radical agitators into
a massive campaign for major political reforms designed to
change drastically the existing structure of English society
and government. William Pitt argued that the internal
threat of the radical societies was inseparable from the
external threat of France and its revolutionary principles.
It appeared to the government that
the utmost industry is . . . employed by 
evil-disposed persons in this kingdom, acting in
concert with.persons in foreign parts, with a view 
to subvert the laws and established constitution 
of this realm and to 4£estroy all order and 
government therein. . . .
Speeches from all sides in Parliament, with the exception of
the Fo.xite Whigs and the radicals at the end of 17 92 and in
1793, made reference to radical societies endeavoring to
subvert the constitution and accused these groups of
42fomenting disturbances among the lower classes. It was in 
this climate of fear and suspicion that the collier seamen 
had to act in their strike of 1792 and the anti-press riots 
of 1793.
Throughout this period local correspondents informed
the central government of the circulation of seditious
43propaganda at Tyneside and of the "dissatisfaction
prevalent among the labouring ranks arising from Principles
44industriously propagated among them" by outsiders. It was
reported that one thousand copies of the sixpence edition of
Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man were sold on Tyneside
45during the summer of 1792 despite the Royal Proclamation
against seditious publications. The shipowners believed
that the Civil Power seems very inadequate to the 
inforcing [sic] a due observance of order and 
subordination among so unruly a body especialy 
[sic] when such Pains is [sic] taking [sic] to sow 
the seeds of disafection [sic] to our excellent 
government by cheap4gpublications of the most 
dangerous principles.
Powditch was alarmed by the
thousands of Pittmen [sic][,] Keelmen, Waggonmen, 
and other labouringmen, hardy fellows strongly
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impressed with the new doctrine of equality, and 
at present composed of such combustible matter 
that the ^ a s t  spark will set them in a 
blaze. . . .
The Times informed its readers that the "spirit of riot"
among the seamen did not arise from legitimate grievances
over wages, but that their demands were directly "in
imitation of the French" example.
The general cry among the rioters is--let us have 
a more equal division of property, for why should 
one man be richer than another? A pretty strong 
symptom this of what our wealthy Citizens and 
L a n d h o l d e r s ^ r e  to expect from any change in our 
Government!
The fear of political disaffection and popular turbulence 
among the lower classes led the Pitt administration to view 
such alarmist information with much less scepticism than 
would otherwise have been the case.
From the central government's perspective, one of the 
most alarming aspects of the seamen's strike of 1792 was the 
dilatory reporting of the disturbance by local observers. 
The Home Office had neither the bureaucracy nor the 
authority to maintain its own agents in all parts of 
Britain. Instead, it functioned as a channel for information
about the situation in the provinces supplied to the central
government by local government officials, naval and military
officers and men of local importance. The strike of 17 92
apparently indicated, however, that neither local officials
nor private citizens could be relied upon to report even
49large-scale disturbances to the central government. Except
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for an intimation of problems at Tyneside contained in a
5 0letter from Charles Townsend on 31 October, Nepean claimed
that "His Majesty's Servants were entirely uninformed of
these circumstances previous, to the receipt of Mr. Burden's 
51[sic] letter" on 5 November. Burdon had already received
two letters about the impasse between the seamen and the
shipowners including one from Bulmer which Burdon forwarded
to the Home Office. Burdon believed it was his duty to
inform the central government but, as a Durham county
magistrate, he also believed that such information should
"come with more Propriety" from the Newcastle magistrates.
Unfortunately, none of these magistrates thought it
necessary to inform the central government. Burdon arrived
in Newcastle for the shipowners' meeting on 24 October but
he waited eleven days to write to the Home Office. He now
felt compelled to do so because of the inability or
unwillingness of the Newcastle magistrates to settle the
strike which had already paralyzed the port and the seaborne
5 2coal trade for "near 3 weeks." On the same day, 3
November, Powditch also wrote to the Home Office but he had
not bothered to do so until one of his own ships was
5 3detained by the strikers. Despite the government’s 
assertion of its confidence in the ability and judgment of 
the Tyneside authorities, it was disappointed and alarmed in 
the quality and quantity of the information they provided 
about the strike. According to Nepean,
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this information appears to be in many respects 
extremely defective and insufficient, particularly 
in regard to the reasons of the magistrates for 
being unwilling to lessen the Force at Tynmouth 
[sic] Barracks, although no intelligence has ever 
been transmitted to Government of any disturbances 
among the Seamen at Newcastle. It is extremely 
necessary that some further information should be 
obtained. . . .
To remedy this deficiency, the Home Office ordered Assistant
Adjutant General Colonel Oliver Delancey to the Tyne to take
command of the troops there and, equally important, "for the
purpose of furnishing the Government with such information"
about "the real nature and extent of the Proceedings" of the
54collier seamen. Once informed, however, the central 
government acted immediately by dispatching naval and 
military forces to the Tyne.55
Pitt described the reports from Shields as being "not
c  / r
pleasant" and the Home Office papers pertaining to the
seamen's strike indicated the seriousness with which the
government took such reports— they were often labelled
5 7"Seditious Proceedings on acct. of Wages." In the King's
Speech, when Parliament convened on 13 December, Pitt
described "a spirit of tumult and disorder . . . [which] has
5 8shewn itself in acts of riot and insurrection" which led
him to consider calling out the militia, apparently for
59domestic police duty. During the debate in the Commons on 
the Address of Thanks, Charles James Fox admitted the 
occurrence of "some slight riots" but he expressed 
incredulity that the government believed that the riots were
59
"used only to cover an attempt to destroy our happy
constitution." Fox asked the other members of the Commons
if they too believed that
the avowed object of the complaint of the people, 
was not the real one— that the sailors at 
Shields . . . did not really want some increase of 
their Wages, but were actuated by some design of 
overthrowing the constitution? Is there a man in 
England, who believes this insinuation to be 
true?
Fox in the Commons and Lansdowne in the Lords challenged the 
Pitt administration to produce evidence of insurrectionary 
intent in this disturbance.^ In defending the government, 
Home Secretary Henry Dundas admitted that he could not 
precisely define "insurrection" but that he considered what 
had occurred at Shields to be "nothing less than 
insurrection" and that the measures taken by the government 
to restore public order were fully justified under these 
circumstances.^
Thus by the end of 1792 there was a general stiffening 
of attitude among those responsible for public order against 
any manifestation of popular discontent. Previously, the 
central government and the local magistrates could adopt a 
restrained or even tolerant attitude toward simple demands 
for the redress of obvious social or economic grievances. 
This posture was no longer tenable when it seemed that such 
disaffection might work for a radical transformation of 
society. Whatever the economic reasons behind the sterner 
attitude displayed toward labor combinations at the end of
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the eighteenth century, after the 1780s the decisive factor
was the government's concern for domestic security and
public order under the belief that such combinations often
produced social unrest and could easily disguise
6 3revolutionary conspiracies. The government's response to
the seamen's strike of 179 2 indicated it feared "something 
64more serious" than a labor dispute— it feared workers 
motivated by political grievances as well. It is therefore 
not surprising that the government responded in the manner 
and with the force it did. While this might be deemed an 
overreaction, the Pitt administration chose to err on the 
side of caution by dispatching naval and military forces too 
formidable to be opposed by the s t r i k e r s . T h i s  reponse 
ultimately broke the seamen's organization and the 
discipline necessary to maintain the the strike and forced 
them to settle the dispute by lowering their demands.
The Tyneside collier seamen provided a cogent example 
of the combination of moderate methods, skillful leadership 
and effective organization which were necessary to 
successful labor activities in the eighteenth century. One 
of the most obvious features of their organization and 
methods was the remarkable degree of retraint displayed by 
the seamen in 17 92. The seamen were able to control the port 
of the Tyne for several weeks and present a united front to 
both the magistrates and the shipowners and they did so with 
very little violence, as even observers hostile to their
61
cause reported. Because of this, the local magistrates, the 
Home Office and the military and naval officers present were 
reluctant to initiate decisive action against the strikers 
and were markedly unsympathetic toward the intransigence 
displayed by some of the shipowners. As a result, the 
shipowners were forced to offer considerable concessions to 
the strikers' demands. This pattern of moderation and 
nonviolence was not unknown in eighteenth century labor 
disputes and it was a recurring feature in disputes on the 
Tyne, dating back as least as far as the Newcastle riots of 
1740. These methods would continue to be used through the 
Tyneside seamen's strike of 1815 which followed a course 
remarkably similar to the strike of 17 9 2 . ^
A primary reason for this attitude was that the 
seamen's activities and objectives were completely devoid of 
any association with ulterior political motivations. The 
seamen did not defy the established order by demanding 
radical social or political reforms. These seamen did not 
represent a working class alienated from the established 
order and there is no evidence of any acute class conflict 
in their labor disputes. The effectiveness of their 
leadership is evident by the seamen's recognition that they 
had a greater chance of success by working within the 
existing social and political structure. The strikers' 
response was not overtly to challenge or abandon the 
existing institutions but to make them work to their
62
advantage by drawing attention to specific economic and
occupational grievances in hopes of obtaining redress from
those who held positions of authority. Until the 1790s it
was possible for disinterested opinion among men of local
importance and even those who held positions of power to
display considerable sympathy with the seamen's objectives
and methods. However, the fear of radical political
agitation and the perceived association of the seamen's
activities with the cause of social and political reform
sharpened official suspicion of all manifestations of
6 7discontent, however legitimate the strikers' grievances.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NURSERY OF SEAMEN— AND THEIR TRADE UNIONISM
The. Tyneside collier seamen did not conform to the 
traditional interpretation of the eighteenth century labor 
"aristocracy". Yet their strike of 1792 indicated that 
skilled workers employing moderate methods under effective 
leadership could achieve considerable success in labor 
disputes. The collier seamen's organization and methods did 
not originate spontaneously, but developed out of the 
peculiar economic nature of the seaborne coal trade and the 
vital function which the seamen performed within its 
structure, and out of the social basis of the Tyneside 
maritime community. An examination of these factors does 
much to explain the seamen's ability to organize themselves 
so consistently and successfully in labor disputes during 
the late eighteenth century.
Clark Kerr and Abraham J. Siegel formulated an 
"isolated mass" hypothesis to explain why certain 
occupations are consistently more strike-prone than others. 
According to this theory, the workers most likely to strike 
are those who live in their own separate communities bound 
by their own collective set of moral and behavioral codes, 
traditions, social expectations and economic interests. The 
members of such a community form a cohesive but isolated 
mass, almost "a race apart," from the larger culture or
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society.1 As a group, the Tyneside merchant seamen displayed
the requisite characteristics of an isolated mass. Kerr's
and Siegel's hypothesis is consistent with data on
eighteenth century labor disputes. According to C.R.
Dobson's calculations, the merchant seamen were the second
2most strike-prone workers during the century.
3Tyneside was geographically isolated from the rest of
England. The region was
shut out from all but the most limited 
communication with other parts of England by the 
almost impassable roads, intense local jealousies, 
and precariously uncertain vagrancy laws of the 
time. . . . [The] population, wholly seafaring, or
drawing its means of subsistence from the sea, 
knew less of England and its people than of 
countries across the main and their multifarious 
inhabitants.
Tyneside may have been cut off from access to the interior 
of England but, as a seaport, it attracted its share of "the 
extraordinary and ever-changing variety of sea-folk bearing 
up for the shelter, or trade, or protection" of the harbor. 
Tyneside was a distinctly maritime community by the end of 
the eighteenth century and perhaps "no other 
seaport . . . presented so bewildering a variety of folk and
character and speech and costume in so concentrated a
4form. . . ."
In the eighteenth century, the collier seamen could not 
be described as cut-off as a class. In the port, the entire 
community centered upon, and lived by, the river and the 
sea.^ The collier seamen formed a large and integral part of
7 2
this maritime community and yet they retained the
distinctive characteristics and traditions of their
particular trade. The coal trade was "an arduous and
dangerous calling [which] through so long a period developed
a highly characteristic and so strongly differentiated human
being. . . . "  The collier seaman was "a strange being" and
if his breeding has been north of Yarmouth, he is 
distinguished with the title Collier's nag; and 
indeed he is a rare horse that will never fail you 
in bad Weather, being as insensible to Rain, Cold 
or Thunder as a Cannon-Bullet, He is generally 
above the common size of other Tars, in Bulk, 
Strength and Courage, which is mainly owing to his 
northern Diet, which he thinks on with a heavy 
Heart every time he sees a good Coal Fire. He is a 
great Admirer of North-country Beef and 
Pease-Pudding, yet allows Newcastle Ale and Salmon 
to be the most Superlative Diet in the Universe.
The distinctiveness of the collier seamen was noted by
others engaged in the shipping trades. The Tyne became a
port for the Baltic and Continental trades and as more
foreign sailors became familiar with the collier seamen they
called them "North Sea Chinamen" because of their rather
8difficult Geordie dialect and- voice inflections.
The collier seamen were also distinguished from others 
in the Tyneside maritime community by their own particular 
customs and traditions. One custom which bound the seamen 
was the singing of their local anthem, a ballad by Doctor 
Fitch entitled "The Cliffs of Old Tynemouth" sung to the 
tune of "The Meeting of the Waters." This song was sung, 
weather permitting, on every ship manned by the Tyneside
collier seamen on each day of the month that their half-pay
was due. . This was called "White Stocking Day" because it
was a custom for the sailors' "Judies" or "Mary Ellens," the
wives and girlfriends of the crew, to wear white cotton
stockings and present themselves at the shipowner's office
with the half-pay notes to draw the allotment which the
9seamen had left them.
The collier seamen were selective as to those who would 
be admitted into the ranks of their trade. Despite the 
cosmopolitan nature of those who frequented the port of the 
Tyne, a "foreigner" in contemporary parlance was not a man 
from another country but one from another district. The 
seamen did not readily accept those "Scotch Bobs" or 
"Norfolk Alecs" who sought employment in the collier fleet. 
This was not simply a reflection of the geographical 
insularity of Tyneside or quaint regional prejudices. In 
the labor, history of Tyneside, such foreigners were often 
used as scab labor and strike-breakers. The goals of the 
early trade unions and friendly societies often reflect this 
experience in their attempts to restrict employment in a 
particular trade. Similarly, London youths were not welcome 
as apprentices in the collier fleet although, for some 
reason, Danish youths apparently were. Knock-kneed and 
squint-eyed seamen were unpopular aboard ships but 
bow-legged seamen were preferred to straight-legged m e n , ^  
presumably because bow-leggedness was a mark of experience
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in the shipping trades.
Unlike the deep-water or "Sou' Spainer" shipping trade, 
the coasting trade from the Tyne to London was dominated by
ships manned by members of the same family. This "family
ship" system insured that the common economic and 
professional interests of the collier seamen were reinforced 
by immediate family ties and connections to seamen in the 
other Tyneside communities. This factor also helps explain 
why the collier seamen did not commit the violent excesses 
they often had the power to do during their labor disputes. 
These seamen were not waterfront rabble but respected family 
m e n ^  with a recognized importance of status and function 
within the local community and economy.
The strength of custom and tradition which bound the 
collier seamen was bolstered by- the knowledge that they 
performed a vital function within the structure of the coal
trade which was important not only locally but to the
national economy as well.
Tyneside was economically dependent upon the commercial 
interests of the coal trade and its allied industries, the 
shipbuilding and shipping trades. Early in the eighteenth 
century the collier fleet was owned or controlled by masters 
from ports south of the Tyne. Gradually the building and 
operation of the fleet moved northward until, by the 1760s, 
it became possible to speak of the northeastern collier 
fleet, built in the Northeast by northeastern capital and
7 5
manned by northeastern seamen. In 1740, there were only
four ships of an estimated total of eight hundred tons
belonging to South Shields. In the thirty years prior to
1792 the number of ships in the port of Shields increased
from thirty to "not less than 120" sail. By 1809, there
were five hundred ships totalling more than forty thousand
tons belonging to Shields and over six hundred in the entire
Tyneside merchant fleet. At the end of the eighteenth
century, the port of the Tyne became the third largest in
12England by ships, tonnage and seamen. Frederick Morton
Eden described the region in this period as composed of
those "chiefly engaged in various occupations and trade
relative to commerce" which were "carried on with great
vigour" by the sailors, coalminers, keelmen, shopkeepers,
merchants, tradesmen and gentlemen of independent fortunes
"usually found in a sea-port town.
The predominance of the seaborne coal trade meant that
the collier seamen possessed considerable influence at
Tyneside. Any labor dissatisfaction among them could bring
the local economy to a standstill. The seamen recognized
that they were highly trained craftsmen who were skilled in
manning the complicated sailing ships of the collier fleet.
The collier seamen were considered to be superior even to
others engaged in the maritime trades because "the active
Employ they have in the Coal Trade, with the difficulty of
14Navigation, sooner brings them to Perfection." This high
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level of expertise meant that the collier seamen could not 
be easily replaced by inexperienced workers in consequence 
of a labor dispute.
The collier seamen's unionism did not fill a vacuum of
15labor organization on the Tyne. Two other maritime trades 
were also pre-eminent in early labor organization: the
keelmen and the shipwrights. These trades provided the 
collier seamen with cogent examples of the economic 
self-respect attainable through defensive trade unionism and 
precedents for developing their own unionism.
The seamen were not the first laborers to organize 
themselves on the Tyne. J.U. Nef believed that modern trade 
unionism in Britain began with the Tyneside keelmen. In the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the keelmen 
established their own charity and hospital financed by 
contributions from their wages. The keelmen also 
demonstrated a history of militant labor activities in a 
series of strikes (in 1708, 1710, 1719, 1738, 1740, 1749,
1750, 1771, 1794, 1803, 1809, 1819 and 1822) which usually
focused on grievances over wages and the size and method of 
loading the k e e l s . ^
Occupationally closer to the collier seamen were the 
shipwrights. The expansion of shipbuilding and the collier 
fleet on the Tyne enhanced their economic bargaining 
position and increased the need to defend their interests 
through the formation of friendly societies. In 1795 the
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Shipwrights Association of South Shields was formed, 
followed by the Amicable Association of Shipwrights in 
1798.17
The functions of the keelmen, shipwrights and collier 
seamen within the structure of the coal trade resulted in a 
tradition of mutual hostility and economic competition 
between these workers which precluded any possibility of 
sustained sympathetic support in labor disputes. The coal 
trade was concentrated in a limited geographical area at 
Tyneside, it was confined to workers with specialized skills 
and there was an assured market for its product in the 
Metropolis. Because of these conditions, any particular 
labor group, such as the keelmen, shipwrights or collier 
seamen, which controlled an essential process in the overall 
structure of the coal trade could act to defend or improve 
its particular economic interests not only at the expense of 
their employers but also at the expense of the other workers 
within the coal trade. It has been estimated that more than
38,000 persons at Tyneside were supported directly or
1 8indirectly by the coal trade in 1792. Thus a strike by any 
one group of workers which halted the coal trade jeopardized 
the livelihoods of thousands of other workers and their 
dependents.
This competitive and unsympathetic attitude among the 
keelmen, shipwrights and collier seamen toward the economic 
grievances of each other was typical in the labor history of
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the eighteenth century. Trade unions in this period had 
very limited objectives and there was little sense of 
inter-trade working class solidarity. The interests of 
labor groups remained local and concentrated on working 
conditions and wage grievances within a particular 
specialized trade. There was as yet no organizational link 
between different trades or even within the same trade in 
different localities. Given these conditions and attitudes, 
it would have been difficult to organize labor on a large 
scale because the differences between trades or even between 
various grades of workers within the same trade were often
as acute as the differences between the workers and their
-i 19employers.
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith claimed that
employers in the eighteenth century had the advantage over
their employees because they were fewer in number, were
bound by the common economic interests of their particular
trade and, moreover, combinations among employers were not
legally proscribed as were those of workers. Furthermore,
employers were strongly united against all labor
combinations. According to Smith,
masters are always and every where in a sort of 
tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not 
to raise the wages of laborers above their actual 
rate. To violate this combination is every where 
a most unpopular action.
Smith's arguments do not hold true for the Tyneside 
shipowners who did not represent a monolithic opposition
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against the seamen's attempts to improve their wages and 
working conditions. The shipowners varied considerably in 
their attitudes, motives and actions towards the seamen's 
combinations. The division within the shipowners was most 
clearly seen in the strike of 17 92 when some owners were 
willing to capitulate to the seamen's demands, even after 
they were raised to four guineas, while others remained 
opposed to any concessions to their employees.
The shipowners were not bound together, but rather were 
divided by the economics of the coal trade. The shipowners 
were in a weak position between the well-organized 
coalowners and the powerful London coal buyers, both of 
which had ships which competed with those of the independent 
Tyneside shipowners. The Tyneside collier fleet was 
controlled by many small independent shipowners who owned 
shares in ships or owned one or two ships outright. This 
system increased the shipowners' profits by dividing the 
risks of the sea-borne coal trade. However, the economic 
competiton between these numerous shipowners also made it 
difficult for them to unite, even against the seamen. The 
small investors and owners were well aware that their 
economic interests would suffer as a result of collective 
wage bargaining. These shipowners could view a short 
stoppage in the shipping trade with equanimity because one 
of its effects would be to increase the coal prices in 
London, but a long stoppage was something completely
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different. With their relatively few capital reserves, a
long strike could be economically devastating for the small
shipowners. This was especially true if the seamen were
successful in obtaining higher wages because, in addition to
wages, the Tyneside shipowners were responsible for the
subsistence of the collier crews, payments for repairs of
the ships, maritime insurance and the upkeep of the
lighthouses on the Tyne, the purchase of ballast for the
return trip from London and the commissions paid to the
London coal f a c t o r s . ^
In the strike of 17 92, the seamen insisted upon the
shipmasters "employing a greater number of seamen" on each 
21voyage. This demand may have arisen out of the
technological changes which were affecting the collier trade
at the end of the eighteenth century. At this time, two
masted brigs were replacing the older flyboat-type collier.
The absence of a mast amidships enabled a larger hatch to be
developed which facilitated the loading of coal and allowed
22a reduction in the size of the collier crews.
The competition between the numerous small shipowners
encouraged the employment of apprentices and this demand may
also have been a means to end the shipmaster's practice of
23employing them instead of able-bodied seamen. There were 
several incentives for the shipmasters to engage in this 
practice. In 17 04, an "Act for the Increase of Seamen and 
Better Encouragement of Navigation and Security of the Coal
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Trade" authorized local parish overseers to bind any pauper 
boy over age ten "to the sea service" until age twenty-one.
i
Shipmasters were obliged to accept these apprentices or pay 
24a £10 fine.
Apprentices were also economically beneficial to the
shipmasters. They were hired in certain ranks and paid
accordingly, although the apprentices had to turn their
25wages over to their masters. Captain Alexander Cochrane
explained that
it is the Interest of many of the Ship Masters to 
foment these disturbances as They are allow'd by 
custom to receive the same wages for their 
Apprentices that is paid the seamen consequently 
it is Their Interest that is should be as high as 
possible.
Those shipowners and masters who could hire more apprentices
had a distinct economic advantage over those who could not.
Testimony presented to the House of Commons Committee on the
Coal Trade in 1800 explained that
those who have a great Number of Apprentices 
encourage high Wages, because that enhances the 
general Price of Coals at the Market, and the Loss 
falls upon ^ o s e  Ship Owners who have but few 
Apprentices.
In 17 90, an anonymous Newcastle shipowner published a
handbill in which he criticized his fellow owners for
abusing this practice. It was
a fact of too obvious Notoriety, that raising the 
Wages of Sailors to an exhorbitant price, has not 
constantly arisen from themselves altogether, but 
frequently by the influence of Masters and Owners 
of small Shares of Ships, who have the Benefit and
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Emolument of Apprentices, to the great Injury of 
all other Parties, who are concerned or connected 
with them; for it is certainly a very palpable 
Fraud and repugnant to all Principle of Justice or 
Equity, that the Master or Acting-Owner, should be 
allowed to charge to the Ship's Account 6 or 8 
times higher Wages, than he actually and bona fide 
pays; which, I am sorry to add, is the common 
Practice, in rating the Wages of an Apprentice at 
Five Guineas a Voyage, to whom he does not i n t a c t  
pay more than Ten or Fifteen Shillings. . . .
In addition, by a charter granted by Henry VIII in
1510, one means of becoming a free burgher of the
Corporation of Newcastle was to serve a seven-year
apprenticeship. The Society of Masters, Pilots and Seamen
of the Trinity House had the privilege of making the sons
and apprentices of its members freemen of the Corporation
which entitled them to vote for its parliamentary
2 9representation. The anonymous Newcastle shipowner also
criticized this policy, claiming that apprenticeship had
become merely a facade to benefit both the shipmasters and
those who sought freeman status. Those masters and owners
who are Freemen of the Corporation of Newcastle 
perhaps do not pay any Thing, many of Them having 
Apprentices who serve Seven Years, without any 
pecuniary Reward, but solely for the Purpose of 
obtaining the Freedom of the Corporation.
By 1790, the supply of collier seamen exceeded the 
demand and "the Number of Sailors now at Shields are full 
l-3d more than can be e m p l o y e d . " ^  The economic competition 
between the shipowners made some form of defensive labor 
organization by the seamen essential if they were "to combat 
the cost-cutting activities in which the shipowners
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engaged.
Not all of the obdurate shipowners' intransigence
resulted from economic motives--the refusal to grant higher
wages. A concern for the dignitas of the owners was also
involved. To concede under pressure from employees was not
simply a matter of labor relations, but something which
struck at the the entire principle of due subordination as
32the basis of the established social order. Shipowner
Thomas Powditch defended his opinions during the strike of
1792 by arguing that
tampering with a Mob, treating with Rioters or 
offering terms to People illegally assembled for 
the purpose of extorting high wages from their 
employers are Crimes lit^Le inferior in magnitude 
to rioting itself. . . .
The development of a united front of shipowners was
furthered hampered by the fact that these employers could 
not depend upon the unquestioned support of the local and 
national governments in making common cause against the
seamen. The government displayed no monolithic disposition 
to act as the mere agent of local employers attempting to 
hide behind its authority and there was no significant 
tendency of authority designed to keep the working classes 
in subjection. Attempts by labor groups to exercise 
coercive means were not looked upon with favor by the
government, but this did not preclude contacts with labor
leaders who could identify blatant injustices by their 
employers. Local labor leaders became, like their
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employers, another group of "men of influence" and part of
the unofficial government of Tyneside to whom the government
looked for information and solution to local problems.
Overall, the government displayed a willingness to avert or
damp down possible social or economic conflict by
conciliatory mediation rather than unilaterally supporting
employers against l a b o r . ^
Because of the competitive economics of the coal and
shipping trades, the seamen knew the value of public opinion
and they attempted to marshall it to their cause. The early
trade unions were fully conscious of the need for their
proceedings to be open and public in order to rob their
opponents, their employers or the local magistrates, and
workers in other trades of the opportunity to misrepresent
their opinions or to misconstrue their immediate plans or
ultimate objectives. By publicizing their cause, the seamen
hoped to gain community consensus and support. This concern
for public relations required the publication of their
resolutions, addresses and declarations either as handbills
or by their insertion in local newspapers. For this,
however, workers were dependent upon the goodwill of the
editors or proprietors of the newspapers. Local hostility
toward the actions of the workers could exert public
pressure and make the cooperation of the editors more
35problematical. During the Tyneside press riots of 1793 the 
seamen published a handbill entitled "Friends and Fellow
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3 6Seamen!" which carefully explained their grievances
against impressment to both seamen and non-seamen in the
Tyneside community. They also resolved to publish their
3 7declarations in the London and Newcastle newspapers --an
action which proved unpopular with the vested interests of
Tyneside. According to Charles Brandling, MP for the county
of Northumberland, "if the Editor of the Newcastle Chronicle
who has published the resolutions of the Sailors can be laid
hold of by the Law, He deserves the most condign
3 8Punishment."
The coal trade was one of Britain's most valuable
resources and thus the influence of the collier seamen also 
extended far beyond Tyneside. Any work stoppage by them was 
not only a local economic crisis but had national
implications because of its ultimately detrimental effects 
on the fuel supply of the Metropolis. This factor explains 
the interest taken by the central government in any labor 
dispute which affected the seaborne coal trade.
London was dependent upon seaborne imports from the 
great northern coalfield which was almost the sole supplier 
of the Metropolitan market. The absence of any efficient 
means of overland transportation made any serious
competition from other coalfields economically unfeasible. 
Moreover, the quality of inland coal was generally inferior 
to the standard grades produced in the North. In addition, 
the London coal dealers often had vested economic interests
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in the seaborne trade and thus discouraged imports from the
39inland coalfields.
The improvement of inland waterways and canal
construction in the eighteenth century were largely the
result of the increased demand for fuel in the Metropolis.
Of the 165 Acts passed between 1758 and 1802, ninety were
for canals whose primary objective was the transport of
coal. One reason for these improvements was to obtain
better access to the ports for seaborne coal but another was
to avoid the hazards and delays involved in the maritime
coal trade. These improvements were not geographically
¥
distributed, however, and as late as 1800 the northern
counties, unlike those farther south, remained virtually
unaffected by canal construction because of engineering
40difficulties and the opposition of the shipping interests.
London was also prevented from reaping the full 
benefits of these improvements in inland transportation. 
The collier fleet was still considered to be the nursery of 
British naval seamen and any policy which threatened the 
maritime coal trade also threatened the security of the 
country. The City of London also received substantial 
revenue from a sixty percent tax on the colliery price of 
seaborne coal and it was thus considered impolitic to allow 
coal to be transported overland beyond several miles from 
London. Thus the canals brought no such benefits to London 
as the construction of railways was to bring .in the
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nineteenth century— the primary factor which ultimately
broke Durham's and Northumberland's monopoly on the
41 -Metropolitan coal trade.
Because of these factors, London was vulnerable to
interruptions in the distribution of coal. . A labor dispute
at any stage of the coal vend had serious repercussions in
the Metropolis. Coal was not stored at Tyneside and London
had no wharves or depots to store coal during delays in
shipping from the Tyne. The collier seamen could use their
specialized skills and the vital function they performed in
the coal trade to blackmail the coal and shipping interests
into acquiescing to their demands while the shipowners could
justify higher coal prices at the London market as necessary
42to repay them the higher wages paid to the collier seamen.
The Webbs argued that the early trade unions did not
develop "from any particular institution, but from every
opportunity for the meeting together of wage earners of the 
43same trade." The collier seamen had ample opportunity to 
meet with each other because of the sporadic nature of the 
seaborne coal trade. The collier seamen had an 
organizational advantage over the deep-water merchant seamen 
because delays in shipping from the Tyne meant that there 
were often many idle seamen in the port. This situation 
facilitated the development of seamen's trade unionism by 
increasing their contact with each other and by providing 
them with the time and numbers necessary to organize
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effectively.
These delays could also form the basis for the seamen's
economic grievances. Because the seamen were paid by the
voyage, any delay in shipping necessarily reduced the number
of voyages which could be completed and thus decreased the
seamen's annual wages. The average duration of a roundtrip
voyage between the Tyne and London was about six weeks,
although this varied according to the size of the ship.
Small colliers of about 220 tons could make up to fourteen
voyages per year while larger ships rarely made more than
4 4eight, although the average was about four per year.
The coal industry was, to some extent, a seasonal
trade. The movement of the coal wagons was possible only in
dry weather and it was more difficult and expensive to
maintain the roads and wagonways during the wet winter
months. In addition, winter-wrought coals quickly
deteriorated and were unprofitable to mine, transport and
sell. It was not until the construction of railways on a
45large scale that coal mining became a year-round industry.
The weather was also the most obvious cause of delay in
the sailing of the collier fleet. Until the gradual
introduction of steam power and screw propulsion in the
46nineteenth century, the sailing ships of the fleet were 
subject to the vagaries of wind and weather. Before 1760 
the collier fleet did not sail during December and January 
because of adverse winter wind and sea conditions.
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Prevailing easterly winds could prevent the sailing of the
47ships from the Tyne harbor and their return from London, a 
condition which occurred before the seamen's strike of
49Tides presented an additional problem in navigating
the Tyne because "frequently large Ships are detained for
want of Water on the Bar, even when the Wind is fair and the 
50Sea smooth." The bar was-a ridge of sand at the mouth of
the river51 which
was then as potent as any contrary wind in
governing the movements of the fleets sailing to 
and from the Tyne . . . and it contributed by far
the great of the perils of 'making the harbour' in 
a storm. . . . The 'bar' was at certain tides so 
near the surface as to be visible. . . . The
'b a r 'undoubtedly ruled the sailings of the Tyne
fleet, and as the depth of the water due to the 
state of the tide was in turn modified by the
amount of 'sea' . . . there was at all times some 
uncertainty as to when a^^hip might safely leave 
or come into the harbour.
The delays resulting from the natural navigation
hazards on the Tyne and the problems of operating efficiency
53created by the huge collier fleet were exacerbated by the
policies of the Corporation of Newcastle. Newcastle's
responsibilities as Conservator of the Tyne included
maintaining the river in a navigable condition. To maintain
the navigation and shipping facilities on the Tyne, the
Corporation imposed a tax on shipping, which was a major
54source of its revenue. In 17 92, shipowner Thomas Powditch 
asserted that for thirty years the Newcastle magistrates had
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"been disgraced by their rapacity in collecting the revenue"
55from shipping on the Tyne. Shipowner Joseph Bulmer
complained that the £16,000 in revenue which the Corporation
collected was far in excess of the amount required for the
purpose and that little was actually done by the Corporation
to improve navigation on the Tyne, a situation which Bulmer
believed was "worthy [of] the attention of Government."56
Constantine Phipps (later Lord Mulgrave), naval captain,
polar explorer and "a man of great knowledge in nautical
matters," who stood for a seat in Parliament for Newcastle
in the General Election of 1774, declared that he considered
the Tyne capable of becoming one of the finest navigable
rivers in the world but that the "ignorance, inattention and
avarice" of the Corporation transformed it into a "cursed
horse-pond." In 1800, local opposition to Newcastle's
policies became so acute that the Tyneside shipowners
attempted to indict the Corporation for not repairing the 
57river.
The economic imperatives of the coal trade also 
produced numerous delays in shipping. In 1800, the House of 
Commons Committee on the Coal Trade investigated the causes 
of the detention of the coal ships at the Tyne and the 
effects of the Limitation of the Vend on the coal supply of 
the Metropolis. By this agreement, the Tyneside coalowners 
limited their monthly output of coal production in order to 
control the supply, and thereby the price, of coal in the
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London market. The coalowners loaded only a certain number 
of keels per day so as not to exceed their stipulated 
monthly quota. When this limit was reached, no further 
supply of coal was available until the following month. The 
shipowners registered their ships with the coal fitters, who 
acted as middlemen between the coalowners and shipowners, 
and specified the quality of coal which was to be loaded. 
The ships were then loaded in rotation according to the 
availability of the coal requested and the ships' positions
C Oon the fitters' lists.
This system caused delays if the specified quality of
59coal was not immediately available for loading. It was
more profitable for shipowners to carry high quality coal
because "the inferior Coals . . . bore so low a Price in
the London Market, that it would not have answered to the
Ship Owner to have imported any of that Sort. . . .
Rather than risking their ships on unprofitable voyages, the
Tyneside shipowners "procure only eight voyages of the
superior coals, [because] they get more profit than risking
61twelve voyages of the inferior." There was
always some Detention at Shields in waiting for 
the best Coals, there being greater Profit upon 
them. . . . With a View to that Profit, Ships wait 
on an Average a Fortnight; sometimes they get 
their CargoeSg^n a Day, at other Times in a Month 
or Five Weeks
although some had "been delayed sometimes 6 Weeks, which is
6 3not uncommon." A ship's high position on the fitter's list
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was no guarantee of a short delay because detentions were
also attributed in
great Measure, to the Practice of loading small 
Ships under the Spouts out of their Turn, while 
the large Ships are waiting in the 
Harbour. . . . This is a great Prejudice to the
Consumers of Coal in London, as the large Ships 
come constantly to London, and the smaller Ships 
go mostly coastwise.
The seamen did not share in the economic advantages
which accrued to the coalowners and shipowners as a result
of these delays. The profitability of detaining ships at
the Tyne was . further enhanced by the fact that the
shipowners were not responsible for the seamen's wages
during delays. As a result, any detention at Shields was
attended with little or no Expence, on account of 
the Sailors being shipped for the Voyage; and not 
coming on board till the Ship is loaded; whereas 
the Delay at any other Part of the Voyage is so 
material as to be nearly equal to any
Advantage . . . [the shipowner] could receive by
Delay. 3
One of the demands made by the seamen in the strike of 17 92
was that they be provided subsistence during these delays so
"that when a Ship has a long turn the Seamen is not to be
Turn'd on those but to have their Victuals on Board the same
6 6as though the Ship was at Sea."
The nature and provisions of the seamen's contracts 
also insured that there were often many idle seamen in port 
waiting to be paid. Until the early eighteenth century, the 
contract between the seaman and his employer was informal
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and .verbal and. each agreement was for a single voyage. 
Seamen's contracts came under legislative authority with the 
"Act for the Better Regulation and Government of Seamen in 
the Merchant Service" in 1729. This Act decreed that all 
merchant seamen, except apprentices, were to sign written 
contracts with the ship's owner or master within three days 
of going on board. This written contract would provide 
conclusive evidence in legal disputes over wages which had 
been a recurrent problem when the contracts were verbal. 
Wages were to be paid, unless contrary terms were written 
into the contract, on the final discharge of the seaman or 
within thirty days of the ship's clearing the Customs House, 
whichever was earlier. This delay in payment became the 
basis for crimping in the seaports because it kept the 
seamen in port and short of money until the final settlement 
of wages. It was not until after the Napoleonic Wars were 
ended and there was a substantial surplus of seamen that 
further attention was given to this problem. In 1819 it was 
recognized that the waiting period for final wage settlement 
was too long, and by the "Act for facilitating the Recovery 
of Wages of Seamen in the Merchant Service" it was reduced 
to two d a y s . ^
The written contract required under the Act of 1729 was 
an improvement over the earlier informal agreements in 
resolving wage disputes. However, the relative
inflexibility of the written contract came under economic
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pressure during the wars of the eighteenth century. While
the demand for seamen tended to be geographically
disproportionate in peacetime, the demand was greatly
distorted in wartime. War-induced inflation made merchant
seamen dissatisfied with wages established a year or more
earlier. As a result, shipowners and masters attempted to
bind the seamen to fixed rates of wages over longer periods
6 8of time by written contracts. As one sympathetic naval
officer observed, the Tyneside collier crews had "much
69reason" to complain about their contracts. The seamen
quickly learned that desertion or strikes were the only
70means to increase their wages.
Although the collier seamen enjoyed a distinctive 
status within the seaborne coal trade and the Tyneside 
maritime community, they were not highly paid workers by 
contemporary standards. Adam Smith described the economic 
position of these workers by explaining that although the 
seamen's
skill and dexterity are much superior to that of 
almost any artificer's, and though their whole 
life is one continual scene of hardship and 
danger, yet for all this dexterity and skill, for 
all those hardships and dangers, while they remain 
in the condition of common sailors, they receive 
scarce any other recompense but the pleasure of 
exercising the one and surmounting the other..
Their wages are not greater than those of common 
labourers at the port which regulates the rate of 
seaman's wages. As they are continually going 
from port to port, the monthly pay of those who 
sail from all the different ports of Great Britain 
is more nearly upon a level than that of any other 
workmen in those different places. . . . The
sailor, indeed, over and above his pay, is
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supplied with provisions. Their value, however, 
may not perhaps always exceed the difference 
between his pay and that of the common labourer; 
and though it sometimes should, the excess will 
not be clear gain to the sailor, because he cannot 
share it with his wife and f a m i l y  whom he must 
maintain out of his wages at home.
The pressures of these delays in shipping could be
economically devastating for the collier seamen, who were
hired and paid by the voyage. Thus the economics of the
coal trade in general and the Limitation of the Vend in
particular caused the "occasional cessation of work, and
consequent riots and disorders" arising from the detrimental
72effects on the seamen's wages.
However, these delays also meant there were many idle
seamen in the port, often for long periods of time. This
situation would provide a basis for an almost continuous
association among the seamen and the time and numbers to
organize on a large scale, if necessary, to resolve their
labor grievances. Once they were in port, meetings of
seamen were simple to arrange— all that was required to get
them together was to send a bellman around the town or to
announce the meeting by a placard or handbill. The collier
seamen probably discussed their grievances with the seamen
from other ports while in London, where delays were
sometimes even longer than in the North. When the collier
seamen acted, however, it was always in their home port on 
73the Tyne.
During these delays, whether
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locked in by an adverse wind, a bad tide, or 'too 
many feet [of] sea on the bar,' there was nothing 
for it but to wait for a change and wile away the 
time in frolic and revelry among -y^he squalid 
drink-shops and crimping dens ashore.
The coal and shipping trades were strenuous and dangerous
occupations which demanded violent forms of relaxation. In
75addition to the brutal sports which these workers enjoyed,
the men of the coal and maritime trades "were notoriously
76heavy drinkers." Those historians who have emphasized the
legal or conservative development of the working class
movement have sometimes overlooked or minimized its more
rowdy and robust features. Yet the development of organized
labor in the eighteenth century was often inextricably tied
to the public house because both the friendly societies and
early trade unions served an important social, as well as
economic, function. The earliest organized labor groups
were those with a permanent base for continuous association,
which was not necessarily the workplace. It was in the
local pubs that many supposedly inarticulate seamen learned
to discuss their economic and occupational grievances with 
77each other. This aspect of pub life was recognized by Adam
Smith who claimed that
people of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public,^gr in some contrivance to raise prices [or 
w a g e s ].
At Tyneside there was ample opportunity for the seamen to do 
this. South Shields had 160 to 170 public houses in 1792,
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79North Shields had 97 and Newcastle had 196. Despite the
advantages of using pubs as communal meeting places, the
stigma of heavy drinking remained a social and economic
liability to the seamen because it allowed their employers
and the local authorities to dismiss their militant labor
activities as mere drunken rioting. In the nineteenth
century, the seamen became more cognizant of the economic
and social benefits of Victorian moral repectability and the
rules of their trade unions meted out fines for 
8 0drunkenness. Pubs provided a means for workers to preserve 
and transmit the values, social conventions and traditions 
of their particular community and occupation and provided an 
opportunity for communal activities and the creatipn of 
mutual loyalties. These habits of working class solidarity 
and cohesiveness became the foundation of effective trade 
unionism.
The collier seamen had several socio-economic 
advantages over other workers which explain the early 
development of their trade unionism. The seamen were highly 
skilled workers who were able to garner considerable 
community support for their activities because of the vital 
function they performed within the structure of the seaborne 
coal trade. Their expertise in manning the complicated 
sailing ships of the collier fleet allowed them to extract 
concessions from the shipowners in labor disputes. Their 
organization and the methods they employed in labor disputes
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were determined by the fact that many seamen were often 
detained in port for long periods of time because of the 
numerous delays in shipping from the Tyne. However, these 
same factors which resulted in the creation of a rudimentary 
trade union also meant that the collier seamen were the 
primary victims of impressment into the Royal Navy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NO MAN WILL BE A SAILOR
The substantive existence of early collier seamen's 
trade unionism can also be detected in their defensive 
resistance to naval impressment. Impressment outraged these 
proto-labor organizers because of the social and economic 
conditions which this practice led to in the Royal Navy. 
Using their past experience of unity and organization, the 
Tyneside collier seamen applied their proven methods to 
create a formidable opposition to the unprecedented 
intensity of impressment at the outbreak of war with 
revolutionary France.
From December 1792 until the Convention's declaration 
of war on 1 February 17 93, there was in Britain a growing 
expectancy of war with France. Much of the effort in 
preparing for war during this period focused on the 
mobilization of the Royal Navy. Despite the Navy's function 
as its first line of defense, Britain had neither the wealth 
nor the manpower to maintain the senior service at is 
optimal fighting capacity in peacetime. A nucleus of the 
fighting fleet was maintained in ordinary by a small 
complement of ship-keepers. Officers were retained on 
half-pay status and crews consisted solely of volunteers for 
summer voyages and outfitting cruises. The threat of 
impending war with France required a rapid and drastic
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increase in the Navy's manpower from a peacetime level of 
16,613 in 1792 to 45,000 in 1793. Sir Charles Middleton 
(later Lord Barham), Comptroller of the Navy Board from 1778 
to 17 90, had prepared for such a contingency by reorganizing 
the Impress Service and by establishing recruiting offices 
in the major ports. By 1793, there were proportionately 
more merchant seamen in the Northeast than in the Southwest 
ports and the Navy expanded its recruiting tactics 
accordingly.^
On 15 December 1792, Regulating Captain Peter Rothe of
the Impress Service arrived in Newcastle under orders from
the Admiralty to begin the recruitment of merchant seamen on
the Tyne. Houses of rendezvous were opened in Newcastle and
2Shields to accept volunteers for the Royal Navy. In this 
period of emergency mobilization, impressment was not used 
as it was hoped that the first battle fleet sent into the 
Channel would be manned entirely by volunteers. Some 
merchant seamen did volunteer, probably reasoning it was 
better to do so and receive the government's bounty than to
3risk possible impressment later. Ultimately the efforts to 
recruit volunteers through bounties were not successful on 
Tyneside. The volunteers entered slowly and their numbers 
remained "very inconsiderable"— only 320 able-bodied and 77 
ordinary seamen out of the estimated 8,000 employed in the
4Tyneside collier fleet volunteered before the war began. 
Clearly their numbers were inadequate to meet the manpower
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demands of Britain's wartime fleet.
Impressment remained as the government's alternative
5for manning the Navy. This practice had certain distinct
advantages over recruiting volunteers— it was cheap and
could quickly mobilize many seamen. The Impress Service
relied on the element of surprise for its success by its use
of undated general press warrants (another of Middleton's
innovations) ready for issue upon an Order in Council.
However, it was difficult to preserve the secrecy of its
preparations from the local seamen, especially in time of
imminent war.® The Tyneside seamen would have heard or read
gossip and rumors of war while in London. This information
and the presence of Rothe and the opening of the houses of
rendezvous on the Tyne would have alerted the seamen to the
likelihood of impressment. In organizing themselves against
this possibility, the Tyneside seamen had an advantage over
other English merchant seamen because a press could be
implemented immediately at the outbreak of war only in the
ports of the South— on the Thames, at Shearness, Portsmouth
and Plymouth. Accounts of the press would reach the extreme
outports in three days, before local g a n g s .could be formed
and tenders hired, manned and outfitted to receive the
pressed seamen. A delay of three weeks or a month was
7possible before a press occurred in the outports of the 
Northeast, giving the Tyneside seamen advance notice and 
adequate time for their preparations.
Ill
Although Rothe had not yet received orders from the 
Admiralty to issue the warrants, he informed a gathering of 
Newcastle seamen that it would be his duty to press if so 
ordered. This threat mobilized the merchant seamen "to 
associate for the purpose of resisting an Impress." On 29 
and 30 January, one hundred or more seamen assembled 
peacefully three times in Newcastle and resolved to oppose
g
impressment even at the risk of their lives.
This united response by the seamen was neither
spontaneous nor unprecedented. The merchant seamen lived in
constant dread of impressment into the Navy, an inevitable
9concomitant of their maritime occupation. This fear was
transmitted to the customs of' Tyneside, where songs told of
the fact that "the [press] tender's at the Bar o' Shields"
or that some young seaman was "snatched away on his wedding
night . . .  by the dirty press gang."10 For much of the
eighteenth century on Tyneside "the popular mind was kept
excited and inflamed by repeated tumults arising out of
ferocious encounters between the gangs and the classes on
whom they preyed."11 Opposition to impressment had a long
history on the Tyne and the merchant seamen clashed
violently with the press gangs in 1755, 1756, 1759, 1771,
1774, 1777, 1779 and 1783. In 1790, the Tyneside seamen
again united against the press during the emergency
mobilization which accompanied the increase of Anglo-Spanish
12friction over the Nootka Sound incident. At the end of
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1792, the seamen had just emerged victorious after a
successful strike for higher wages at Shields. In bringing
their grievances to the attention of the government in 1793,
the methods of opposition learned in these earlier disputes
allowed the seamen to offer a more strenuous and effective
13resistance than would otherwise have been possible.
From their past experience, the seamen learned the
value of discipline and organization. They vowed to
"associate for the purpose of defending ourselves by every
legal Method" and to "preserve Peace and Order; no violence
shall disgrace the Conduct of Men who are engaged in so good 
14a Cause." The seamen, whose numbers varied in estimates
from one hundred to over six hundred, were under the control
of recognized leaders. At their meeting, "they had a
regular Roll call and subscribed their Names or Marks to a 
15paper." This self-regulation was a marked feature of the 
strike of October and November 1792 and it probably 
prevented extreme actions and violence on both sides. It 
permitted the seamen to discipline members of their own 
ranks and to present a united front of opposition to the 
civil and naval authorities.
The seamen sent delegates to meet with Rothe, James 
Rudman, the mayor of Newcastle, and the town's magistrates. 
At R o t h e 1s request, the seamen composed written resolutions 
of their grievances to be forwarded by him to the Lords of 
the Admiralty for their consideration. These resolutions
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were formalized a week later into a petition addressed to
Parliament. Within a few days, this petition was signed by
"a great Number" of the local s e a m e n . A f t e r  .adopting the
idea of petitioning Parliament, the seamen discontinued
their meetings and their activities became calmer. Rudman
hoped that this meant they had abandoned the idea of
resistance in favor of nonviolent means of redress. Those
familiar with the seamen's disposition, however, anticipated
"fatal Consequences" if the attempt to press were made. As
a result, Rudman and the magistrates hoped that Parliament
would consider their petition before the press warrants were 
17issued.
Although the seamen gave their assurance that it was to
remedy the abuses of impressment and "not to create
18Disturbances" that they united, their assemblies were
19illegal under the terms of the Riot Act. At the outset,
when the magistrates ordered the seamen to disperse and
return to their ships as they "would not be suffered to meet
again," the sailors refused until the press gangs were
20removed from Newcastle. The "audacity" of the seamen and 
their ability to defy the magistrates again revealed the 
serious limitiations of local civil government in 
controlling large disturbances in the eighteenth century.
Two concurrent developments strained the already 
limited capabilities of the local authorities to maintain 
order. Their consternation was further increased by
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evidence of a simultaneous combination of Northeast seamen
against impressment. Rudman believed that the Newcastle
seamen were prompted by the example at Whitby where, earlier
in February, the press gangs were attacked and driven out of
town by the local seamen. Two of the ringleaders of that
incident were seen in Shields shortly thereafter. The
Newcastle seamen resolved to communicte their declarations
to the sailors in other ports as they hinted they were not
21alone m  their sentiments against impressment — becoming
one of the first English labor groups consciously to think
22m  national terms. The seamen of Sunderland informed 
William Abbs, the lieutenant of the Impress Service on the 
Wear, that there was "no Call for any Gang for We will not 
be pressed." These seamen threatened to "take Care" of the 
press gangs "and the sooner they are out of the way the
better for themselves for we are determined to be
resolute." There were rumors that the seamen of Sunderland 
and Shields intended to unite with those of Newcastle at a 
general meeting to be held in Newcastle on 6 February. The 
meeting was not held, although the petition issued in 
Newcastle was purported to have come also from the seamen of 
Sunderland and S h i e l d s . ^
Second, in mid-February, "the Rage for increase of 
Wages" spread to the smiths and colliers of the Tyneside
coalworks. Now the magistrates were forced to divide their 
energy and attention to control both the seamen and the
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striking coalworkers. To assist them, three troops of the
Inniskilling Dragoons arrived from Whitby, where they had
been stationed since the altercation between the seamen and
the press gangs three weeks earlier. James Rudman, the
mayor of Newcastle, now feared that the seamen would be only
"too ready" to join in a general labor combination if the
24smiths and colliers "shall persevere in their Measures."
However, the seamen's discontent was not merely another
manifestation of the local labor problems which had plagued
2 5Tyneside for the past thirty years. Their united refusal 
to man the Royal Navy had national consequences for
Britain's security in wartime.
From their resolutions it is clear that the collier 
seamen were not refusing to serve in the Royal Navy because 
of its notorious conditions of service. As Samuel Johnson 
observed,
no man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough 
to get himself into a jail, for being in a ship is 
being in a jail with the chance of being 
drowned. . . .  A man in a jail has room,
better food, and commonly better company.
Danger and strict discipline were not unknown in the
27merchant service. However, because the collier seaman was
a volunteer and because the ship's master could not resort
to the same sanctions against desertion which were operative
in the Royal Navy, the wages and conditions of the merchant
service had to be of a reasonable standard to attract and
28retain seamen. Despite these better conditions in the
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merchant service, the harsh realities of naval life in the
eighteenth century— poor and insufficient food,
overcrowding, high disease and mortality rates, strict
discipline and an indefinite term of service— did not become
issues with British seamen until the naval mutinies at
29Spithead and the Nore m  1797.✓
Neither did impressment itself form the basis of the
seamen's grievances. Few in the eighteenth century
challenged the principle underlying impressment— the power
of a sovereign state to require its citizens to defend the
30nation in time of danger or war. Even most seamen shared
the prevailing belief that impressment, in principle, was an
31unfortunate, but necessary, evil in wartime. It was the
method and application of the principle which caused the
seamen to resist. They were conscious that their resistance
might be misconstrued as a manifestation of disloyalty in
wartime or political disaffection. In their declarations
they were careful to guard themselves against such charges
by professions of veneration and admiration for the
32constitution, "the boast and Glory of Britain." It was on
basic constitutional grounds that the seamen challenged the
practice of impressment. Impressment was perceived by them
as the government's arbitrary and unjust interference in
33their personal liberty.
The manpower pool for impressment consisted solely of 
"person using the sea." In 1378, this definition included
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only sailors of the sea and of nearby rivers. By the late
eighteenth century, however, this definition had been
expanded to encompass sailors of the sea and of rivers,
34streams and canals any distance from the sea. The manpower
available was further limited by those legally exempt from
impressment— masters, chief mates, boatswains and carpenters
on ships over fifty tons and apprentices with less than two
years' maritime experience. Traditionally, while the
collier fleet was perceived as the nursery of British
seamen, its crews were also protected from impressment by
immunities granted by Parliament. Organized trades like the
collier seamen were able to negotiate additional exemptions
and were allowed four free men per one hundred tons of
shipping. Because of the vociferous opposition of the local
coal and shipping trades and consumer interests in the
Metropolis, any infringement of these immunities was avoided
35as long as possible, but not in a crisis. The manpower
demands for 1793 meant that immediate naval concerns
overrode these traditional protections. The Admiralty
withheld all immunities for the Northeast ports while the
seamen resisted in an attempt to blackmail them into
compliance. It was only through the repeated protests of
local representatives both in and out of Parliament that the
3 6protections were reinstated later.
The Tyneside seamen recognized that it was not a lack 
of industry or social usefulness which singled them out as
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37the victims of impressment. On the contrary, the collier
were important and respected members of the Tyneside maritme
community, not waterfront rabble or the dregs of English
society who would later be conscripted as quota-men. It was
their experience and expertise in manning the complicated
sailing ships of the collier fleet which rendered them so
3 8valuable to the Royal Navy. The collier seamen's
value is not altogether to be estimated by their 
Number; the Difficulties of the Navigation in the 
Coal Trade, are admitted to give the Seamen 
derived from it, in Point of Skill, Expertness, 
Patience of Fatigue and Hardship, an incontestible 
Superiority over those drawn from^gthe other 
Maritime Trades of the Kingdom. . . .
Training landsmen to sail and fight was a difficult task,
especially when sailors were needed in wartime. Even more
than the fisheries, the collier fleet had long been
40recognized as the principal nursery of British seamen
because it provided a ready source of trained and
disciplined sailors.
The collier seamen's expertise was so valuable that
this resulted in an inexorable infringement of their
personal liberties which would not have been tolerated if
applied to other segments of English society. The Navy's
recruiting tactics would not have been countenanced if used
even by the British Army because
Englishmen would rise in arms, should the military 
impress for the army, citizens of every rank, from 
the fields, the streets and public roads; but one 
particular class of men seem abandoned by society, 
and relinquished to perpetual imprisonment, and a
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slavery, which, though honourable, ĉ ijts them off 
from most things which men hold dear.
The seamen argued that this "cruel mode" of manning the
Navy, although "countenanced by precedents and supposed to
have been a part of the Common Law," had never been
42sanctioned by the authority of Parliament. In this
assertion the seamen were technically correct— innumerable
statutes since the fourteenth century tacitly recognized the
43legality of impressment, but none formally enacted it. It
was impresssmeht's impending threat to their personal
liberty which justified the seamen's resistance as they
could not "conscientiously, either as Men, Britons, or
Christians, any longer countenance by Compliance such a
44shocking Abuse of Power."
It was no fear of danger or of death that made the 
sprightly Shields tar turn with disgust from the 
thought of serving his king and country .■«,. but 
the knowledge that every element appealinqjBfco the 
instincts of a brave and free man must be outraged 
the moment he put his foot on the deck of a 
British man-o'-war. The merchant service brought 
him as much, perhaps more, danger; perhaps greater 
risk of violent death. It was a hard, cruel life, 
but . . .  it left him at the end of each voyage a 
free man, and with some of the privileges of an 
Englishman. In the navy, as he knew it, the short 
story was one of bondage, of harsh intolerance, 
mutilation, and not seldom of a convict's death.
It was not until Pitt's Quota Acts of 1795 that non-seamen
from all parts of Britain were conscripted into the Royal
Navy. Until then, the responsibility for manning the senior
4 6service fell upon a small and easily recognizable 
seafaring class which believed it was unjustly deprived of
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the rights of personal security and protection enjoyed by
47other Englishmen.
48Impressment created another "calamity" for the
seamen. Not only were they compelled against their will to
sail and fight in the Royal Navy, but they were forced to do
so at wages considerably lower than those paid in the
merchant fleet. The wages of the collier seamen rose in the
eighteenth century. The sailors of Shields struck for
higher wages in October and November 1792 and won 55s. per
London voyage. The periodic demands of war depleted the
4 9collier fleet and caused wages to increase even more. The
Royal Navy, however, did not base its pay on the free market
economy of supply and demand or the cost of living. Its
monthly wages had remained stable since 1653 at 19s. per
ordinary and 24s. per able-bodied seaman and would remain so
until the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore raised them to
25s.6d. and 33s.6d. respectively. Not only were wages
higher in the merchant service, but the seamen were paid
with more certainty at the end of a voyage than could be
50expected in the Royal Navy. The Newcastle seamen
considered the Navy's wages, "which is not Half what we 
receive in the Merchant's Service," derisory compensation 
for the risks involved and woefully inadequate to provide a 
decent standard of living for men of their acknowledged 
experience and expertise.'5'*'
The "melancholy experience" of "the increase of the
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price of provisions and every necessary of life" convinced
the collier seamen that they could not subsist on naval
wages. The seamen were faced with the prospect of being
paid lower wages in the Navy in a period of a rising cost of
living. They did not want to intensify the economic "evils
and burdens" of war by demanding the same wages in the Royal
Navy that they could receive in the wartime merchant fleet.
Instead they insisted on 40s. per month, a sum they believed
would not be a burden among the other expenses of war and to
which their fellow Englishmen would not object. To justify
this demand, the seamen cited the increase of the pay of the
soldiery and of the French seamen in the British Navy as
"Reasons why their Wishes should be attended to." In
addition, the sailors argued that an increase in naval wages
would stimulate volunteering and eliminate the need for the
Impress Service. The money thus saved would almost
52compensate for the higher wages they demanded.
To counteract the seamen's demands, local interests 
offered bounties to volunteers as an additional inducement 
to join the Navy. The Corporation of Newcastle, the local 
Loyalist Association and the Newcastle Trinity House 
contributed to the bounties. In addition to the 
government's bounty offered by a royal proclamation on 1 
December 1792, an able-bodied seaman from Newcastle would 
receive £9.4s.0d. and an ordinary seaman £4.0s.l2d. for 
volunteering. Many of those who subscribed to these
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bounties were Tyneside shipowners whose motives were not
merely charitable or patriotic. The threat of impressment
made it difficult to procure crewmen for the collier fleet.
The Register General of Shipping estimated in 1792 that
245,893 sailors would be needed to man the 462 ships of the
Royal Navy. In Great Britain and its dominions only 118,286
men were employed in the merchant service. The growth of
the population was outpaced by the expansion of the shipping
industry in the eighteenth century which made the
competition between the shipowners and the Royal Navy for
53wartime manpower and shipping more acute. The merchant
seamen "made extraordinary efforts to avoid capture, by
hiding themselves away in remote out-of-the-way holes and
54lurking places" or by fleeing into the countryside to
elude the press until protections were granted. Others left
the country by enlisting on foreign ships— a practice
usually prohibited at the outbreak of war. By offering the
additional bounties to volunteers, the pressure would be
■ 55lessened on the collier crews.
Despite the shipowners' intentions of using the 
additional bounties to ease the pressure on the remaining 
collier seamen and to protect the collier fleet from further 
depletion, the seamen interpreted such bounties as a 
justification of their grievances because "does not the 
Offer of additional Bounty plainly shew, that the [Loyalist] 
Association and others are of Opinion that our present Pay
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is not sufficient?" Besides,
Bounties, however large they may appear at first, 
do not last long; and when they are expended in 
Cloaths [sic] and other Necessaries, we are 
obliged to live upon the same Pay as before which 
we well know from experience we cannot live 
u p o n .
These additional bounties did not produce "the expected
effect" of increasing volunteering because the "Idea most
dwelt on" by the seamen was an augmentation of naval wages
57with some means of remitting a portion to their families.
Until the press warrants were issued and the seamen
actually resisted the press gangs, their activities remained
a local dispute. In that case, Rudman assured the
government that the Impress Service would "receive from the
Magistrates every Protection [and] assistance in their power 
5 8to afford." On 11 February the Pitt government received 
France's declaration of war. The government now had a stake 
in the outcome of this disturbance and it spared little 
effort in providing the force necessary . to resist the 
seamen. Thus it was not a coincidence that the arrival of 
the troops corresponded with the first issuance of the press 
warrants on Tyneside. The magistrates of Durham, 
Northumberland and Newcastle concluded that the 57th 
Regiment of dragoons at Tynemouth Barracks was insufficient 
for restoring order. There was fear that the seamen's 
discontent would spread to the militia of Durham and 
Northumberland and it was recommended to the Home Office
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that troops "which are not localy [sic] attached" be
substituted. The seamen's activities remained virtually
unchecked for almost two weeks before the North York Militia
arrived from Richmond on 13 February. Their arrival provided
little consolation to the local authorities, however,
because, Rudman complained, "tho their Numbers are
considerable We learn four fifths of them are so
undisciplined as not to be much depended upon." As a
result, the magistrates requested an additional two or three
troops of horse to be sent to Durham and
59Chester-le-Street.
On 14 February, the first general press under the
command of Captain Leckey of the Racehorse took place in
Shields. Although deemed a success because "a great Number
of useful hands were procured" for 'the Royal Navy, Rudman
warned that the seamen's appearance of determined resolution
did not fade at the arrival of the press gangs as some had
predicted. On the contrary, the seamen remobilized by
assembling "in large bodies" and they "beat off several
press gangs" in Newcastle. On 19 February, the Newcastle
seamen again expelled the press gangs from North Shields
with the highest marks of contempt,— with their 
jackets reversed. They were conducted by a
numerous mob to Chirton-Bar, and who, on parting, 
gave them three cheers, but vowing, that should 
they ever attempt to-enter Shields, they should be 
torn limb from limb.
Rothe attempted to quiet the seamen by addressing them
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the next day. "From his assurances and the manner in which 
it was received" by the sailors, the Newcastle authorities 
had "great reason to hope that all disquietude with the 
gallant tars will be removed." The magistrates believed 
Rothe had succeeded in quelling the seamen because he 
secured a promise from them that they would not violently 
resist again— although the seamen of Shields broke a similar 
promise to Rothe by again dismissing the gangs from Shields 
on 22 February. The magistrates believed Rothe's assurances 
because he had earned a reputation as the seamen's 
"favourite" through his sympathetic involvement in their 
cause. The seamen respected Rothe because he made their 
case very clear to the Home Office and the Admiralty by
recounting conversations he had with their leaders and by
\ SIpresenting their grievances to the central government. As
a regulating captain, Rothe was responsible for examining
volunteer recruits and pressed men and he could discharge
6 2those physically unfit or wrongfully pressed. Impressment
"was almost as cordially hated by officers of the
6 3Navy . . .  as by the people whom it so cruelly oppressed" 
because of the type- of man it could procure for naval 
service. Officers of the Impress Service had to be careful 
not to overstep the bounds set by the press warrants because 
of the possibility of charges of unlawful pressing. Rothe 
proved not to be one of the notoriously corrupt and 
disreputable "yellow admirals" whose sole interest was the
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head money paid for each seaman accepted. Rothe did not
abuse his power on the Tyne and he abided strictly by the
rules of impressment in accepting or rejecting sailors for
64the Royal Navy. On 26 April
the most extraordinary preparations for impressing 
were made by the crews of the armed vessels lying 
in the harbour. That night, the regiment lying at 
Tynemouth Barracks was drawn up and formed into a 
cordon round North Shields, to prevent any persons 
from escaping. The different press gangs then 
began, when sailors, mechanics, labourers, and men 
of every description, to the number of about two 
hundred,.and fifty, were forced on board the armed 
ships.
Of the 250 captives, only 40 were retained after R o t h e ' s 
6 6examination. During a press at North Shields on 16 and 17
March, the gangs seized 60 men, of whom 22 were released by
Rothe because they were mates, carpenters and apprentices
67exempt from impressment.
On 25 February, eleven days after the first press at
Tyneside, Charles Brandling presented the seamen's petition
to Parliament. By this time, the interposing exigencies of
war and the seamen's reputation for resistance doomed their
cause to failure. Pitt spoke against receiving it
"considering the place from which the petition came." After
a brief discussion, the House of Commons declined to accept
the petition on the technical grounds that it related to
Money for Public Service but it had not been recommended by
the Crown. Pitt did not "feel himself disposed" to
6 8recommending it and "of course it was not received."
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Parliament's rejection of the petition had immediate
consequences at Tyneside. In M arch> the seamen's resistance
continued, but in much more violent forms. Following the
press at Shields on 16 and 17 March, five hundred "Sailors
in Arms" assembled "in a riotous manner, armed with swords,
pistols and other weapons" and attempted to seize the
Eleanor press tender anchored at Peggy's Hole at the mouth
of the harbor at Shields. Their attempt to rescue the
pressed men held aboard was thwarted by thirty troops of the
57th Regiment of dragoons from Tynemouth Barracks. On 19
March, the seamen of Shields tried to unite with those of
Newcastle but were prevented from doing so by the
intervention of a large military force sent to oppose them.
They dispersed, but not before "having treated George
Foster, one of the press gang, with the utmost cruelty at 
69Howden Pans." It was only through a massive and long-term
build-up of military force, which "made the condition of the
seaport more resemble that of a seat of war in an enemy's
country than a portion of His British Majesty's
70dominions," that order was restored at Tyneside.
Despite their defeat, the seamen continued to resist 
impressment. From 1793 to 1797, they failed to bring their 
grievances to the attention of the government by legitimate 
means. In 17 96 the seamen attempted to recreate their
successful strike of 1792 by forcibly preventing the sailing 
of ships from the port. However, the intervention of the
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press gangs in armed boats ended the strike and 42 strikers
were seized and detained in the press tender moored on the
river. Rothe retained only three of these seamen for naval
service. In 1797/ there were three more conflicts over
impressment at Tyneside. Although the government made no
attempt to improve naval conditions during this period, it
did not ignore the problems of naval recruitment. However,
Pitt's solution, the Quota Acts of 1795, failed as an
alternative to impressment because it did not address the
basic social and economic problems which caused the Tyneside
seamen to resist in 1793. The government's continued
intransigence in its refusal to grant timely concessions
eventually drove British seamen to extreme measures in 1797.
The mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, occurring at such a
critical period in the war, should not have surprised the
British government— it had been informed of the seamen's
71grievances since 1793.
Both the collier seamen's success in the strike of 1792 
and their failure in the press riots of 1793 demonstrated 
the organization of these workers into a rudimentary trade 
union. The press riots again revealed the severe
limitations of workers organized only on an ad hoc basis 
without the structure of a formal and legal trade union.
Although the immediate exigencies of the wartime emergency 
overrode all considerations for the economic and 
occupational interests of the collier seamen, this did not
129
preclude their attempt to defend these interests even 
against the forces of the Royal Navy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TO 18 00--AND BEYOND
From 1793 to 1800, the war's effects on the seaborne 
coal trade changed the entire nature of the collier seamen's 
trade unionism. The failure of their opposition to naval 
impressment throughout the decade indicated that their 
prewar methods and organization were not effective when used 
against the forces of the Impress Service. However, 
defensive trade unionism was also no longer as necessary 
because of the war's positive effects on the economics of 
the coal trade. While the immediate results were 
economically advantageous for the collier seamen, the war 
had ultimately detrimental effects as the seamen faced new 
problems unknown in the peacetime coal trade.
The peacetime wages of the collier seamen were 
established by an Act of Parliament but their wartime wages 
were regulated by the economic laws of labor supply and 
demand. From 1793 to 1800 the collier fleet was depleted by 
the manpower demands of the Royal Navy. Out of the estimated 
8,000 merchant seamen in the prewar collier fleet, 1,273 
Tyneside seamen volunteered and 1,892 were pressed into the 
Royal Navy by November 1800. Others left the collier fleet 
to avoid impressment or to engage in lucrative wartime 
privateering. -̂- As a result, "merchant ships lay in the 
harbour for long periods at vast cost because of depleted
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crews . . . [with] wages lost, ships lost, ships damaged,
2[and] cargoes destroyed through undermanning. . . . "
Perhaps nowhere were the effects of war on wages more 
clearly evident than in the example of the collier seamen. 
Without doubt, this particular group of workers did well 
economically out of the French Wars. The wages of the 
remaining collier seamen fluctuated in the period from 1793
3to 1800 but the general trend was upward. In 1792, the 
collier seamen were paid 50s. per London voyage. In their 
strike of October and November, the seamen won 55s. per 
voyage. At the outbreak of war with France in February
1793, their wages rose to £3.10s., by April to £7.17s.6d. and 
at the end of 1793 their wages stood at £8.1s.6d. In July
1794, their wages fell to £5.5s. (summer wages were always
lower than winter wages), but by November they had again
risen to £8. In 1796, £10 per voyage was paid and, by April
1800, the collier seamen were receiving "the enormous rate"
4of eleven guineas per voyage — an increase of 362% over the 
prewar rate of 50s.
By 1800, the collier seamen became some of the highest 
paid workers at Tyneside. The seamen's wages of £10 per six 
week voyage in 1796 represented as average rate of 33s. per 
week. According to Frederick Morton Eden's figures for the 
same period, other laborers at Tyneside earned considerably 
less. A pitman earned about 16s., a keelman 15s. to 20s., 
an agricultural laborer 14s. and a common laborer 9s. to
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512s. per week. A collier seaman serving in the Royal Navy
as an able-bodied seaman earned 6s. and an ordinary seaman
6earned 4s.9d. per week until 1797.
The cost of living rose during this period due to the 
combined pressures of wartime inflation and provision 
shortages. Despite this increase, the cost of living did 
not exceed the increase in the seamen's wages during this 
same period. The' price of wheat, by which the cost of 
living was measured, was 43s. per quarter in 1792. It rose 
steadily to a peak price of 78s.7d. in 1796, declined until
71799 and again rose to 113s.lOd. in 1800. The only labor 
dispute among the collier seamen during this period, their 
attempted strike of 1796 which was defeated by the 
intervention of the press gangs, reflected the experience of 
the increase in the price of wheat and the resultant bread 
crisis which afflicted Britain in the middle years of the
Qdecade. The almost complete absence of any labor disputes 
during the period from 1793 to 1800 can be partially 
explained by the fact that the collier seamen were enjoying 
the benefits of the wartime economy without the need for 
recourse to strikes to increase their wages and their 
standard of living.
The obvious advantages of the increase of seamen's 
wages were negated to some degree by the peculiar conditions 
of the wartime seaborne coal trade. Employment in the 
collier fleet remained inconstant and uncertain. The
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situation was made more precarious by the presence of French
warships off the English coast and the threat of capture by
French privateers in the North Sea. The delays caused by the
vagaries of weather and the economics of the Limitation of
the Vend were increased by the necessity, of organizing
military convoys to protect the collier fleet from the Tyne 
9to London. Employment in the collier fleet was also less 
secure because fewer collier seamen were needed during the 
war. The large colliers were commandeered for use in the 
military transport service, leaving only a few old or small 
ships in the collier fleet. In 1789, there were 1,300 ships 
in the northeast collier fleet but by 1800 this number had 
dwindled to only 597 . ^
Not only were fewer seamen enjoying the economic 
benefits of high wartime wages, but the composition of the 
collier crews changed drastically during this period. By 
1800, few of the seamen who organized themselves in 1792 and 
1793 remained in the collier fleet.
Because the British Navy was manned at the expense of 
the shipowners, Parliament in April 1793 eased their 
manpower predicament by suspending part of the Navigation 
Acts and authorizing British merchant ships to have 
three-fourths of their crews comprised of foreign sailors 
for the duration of the war. This measure, and the wartime 
increase of wages in the collier fleet, encouraged 
foreigners, landsmen and other non-seamen to enter the
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merchant service. To protect these seamen from the press,
the shipowners began to rely on the crimping system which
replaced the free-bargaining labor agreements of the
eighteenth century after the French W a r s . ^
Although by 1800 the shipowners complained that "the
only Persons we can engage, are those who labour under some
bodily Infirmity: All young Seamen would be immediately
12taken from us," there were other seamen who were protected
from impressment and filled the ranks of the depleted
collier fleet. Crews consisted of
Apprentices, from Twelve to Twenty-one Years of 
Age, indentured for either Three or Seven 
Years, . . . they are chiefly obtained from the
Country, many from Scotland, and even from 
Shetland, at a great Expencef;] . . . Foreigners,
but not so numerous[;] . . . Men rejected from the
King's Service, who are generally known by the 
Description of protected Seamen; and . . . during
the Autumn and Winter, ^  Men protected for the 
Greenland Whale Fishery.
The high wartime wages of seamen encouraged the
shipowners to employ apprentices who were protected by an
Act of Parliament for the ' period of. their indenture.
Despite this immunity, the shipowners had difficulty
maintaining the supply of apprentices because their
protections were
so often violated, and that in a most wanton 
Manner, whereby we cannot get Servants even at 
high Wages; we give from £50 to £60 for the Three 
Years Servants, which high Price proceeds from the 
little securjjy they have of being protected from 
the Impress.
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The shipowners recommended to the House of Commons Committee
on the Coal Trade in 1800 that all maritime apprentices be
protected from impressment because this would
tend greatly to increase the Number of Seamen, and 
prevent the enormous Rate of Wages, not only in 
the Coal Trade, but also in the Baltic Trade; but 
the Protection to the Three Years Servants ought 
to be more particularly attended to, as they are 
in general from 16 to 20 Years of Age, and often 
leave -.other Professions to come into the Coal 
Trade.
The Greenland fishermen's protections also granted them
immunity from impressment, a notorious method of
strike-breaking whereby the shipowners could encourage the
selective pressing of known labor leaders. Because of this,
the shipowners considered them to be "the Ringleaders of all
Disturbances for raising Wages. There are hardly any
instances of Detention [of ships], but when the Greenland
16Men are in Port." Despite this belief, these seamen
comprised only "a very small Proportion to the Whole,
formerly there were from 12 to 17 Ships from Newcastle
employed in that Trade; at present [1800] there are not more
than T h r e e . I t  therefore seems unlikely, given the
fishermen's relatively small numbers and temporary annual
residence in the port, that they could have been "the
18principal Movers" of all labor disturbances involving
hundreds of collier seaman. Labor disputes among the seamen 
occurred in response to immediate economic and occupational 
grievances and did not necessarily correspond to the autumn
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and winter months when the Greenland fishermen were in 
19port. The Committee on the Coal Trade, however, concurred
in the shipowners' opinions about
an Evil which . . .  is productive of great Delays 
and' Embarassments [sic]: the Evil . . . is, the
Combinations that have repeatedly formed amongst 
the Mariners for an Augmentation of their 
Wages. . . . The success of these Combinations is 
stated to be owing in a great Degree to the 
Protections enjoyed by the Greenland Fishermen, 
who during Part of the Year are employed in the 
Coal Ships.
The Committee proposed to submit to the Commons a request
for "some Provision, that may render, under given
Circumstances, their Protections unavailable, [which]
20might . . . contribute to remove this Evil."
The change in the composition of the collier crews was 
a further explanation for. the lack of labor disputes between 
1793 and 1800 . Those seamen who had led the strike of 1792 
may have been pressed or volunteered for naval service, 
leaving the remaining collier crews without the effective 
leadership and experience necessary to organize 
successfully.
Despite the immediate economic benefits which war 
brought to the collier seamen, they recognized as early as 
17 93 that such gains would be only temporary and would 
accrue only to those who remained in the merchant service. 
Those seamen who volunteered for naval service or failed to 
elude the press gangs faced the additional problems of low 
naval wages, the maintenance of their dependents in their
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absence and the resultant dislocations of postwar 
demoblization.
In 1793, the collier seamen complained that "it was
very hard to be compelled to serve when the [Navy's] Wages
would not support their Families." Although they had "at
Heart the Interest of our most Gracious Sovereign and our
Nation in general," the seamen could not "at the same time
21forget our little ones and wives." One of the problems 
faced by pressed men was the maintenance of their families 
in their absence. Unlike the special allowances granted to 
the families of militiamen, the rate and nature of poor 
relief for seamen's families were the same as that granted 
to ordinary parish paupers. War put additional strains on 
the poor rates. In the parish of All Saints, where most of 
the Newcastle seamen lived, the poor rate doubled during the 
first year of the war and it rose to as high as 6s. in the 
pound. The collier seamen's concern for the economic fates 
of their families was well-founded. By the mid-1790s North 
Shields was
burthened with the families of 76 impressed men: 
their usual weekly allowance is 9d. for the wife 
and Is. a week for each child. The whole weekly 
charge, at present, arising from their 
maintenance, amounts to £8. Tinmouth [sic] 
township supports 33 families of impressed men, at 
the rate of £3.10s. a week
and South Shields supported 74 wives and 113 children of
22pressed seamen at a cost of £8. 6s. 3d. per week. Faced 
with the possibility of having their families become "a
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Burden to the rest of our Fellow Subjects," the sailors
insisted that provisions be made to allot one-half of their
2 3naval pay to be remitted to their families at home, as was
the custom in the merchant service.24 A form of this
provision would not be achieved by British naval seamen
until 1795 and then it applied only to sailors who
25voluntarily entered the Royal Navy.
The experience of the demobilization at the conclusion
of the American War a decade before probably led the seamen
to condemn the social and economic crises which would again
result from the eventual demobilization of the British 
2 6Navy. After being compelled to serve in the Navy and
possibly "to ruin our Families, to lose our Limbs or Lives,"
the seamen faced "at the end of War . . .  to be paid
off . . . [and] to be turned adrift, at a Distance from our
Friends without the Means of Procuring an honest 
27Livelihood." This situation resulted from the policy of
paying off the seamen as quickly as possible in order to
avoid the additional expense and discipline problems of
keeping them in the Navy after the conclusion of a war.
This was seldom an orderly procedure and often thousands of
seamen were kept waiting, indigent and riotous, for their
pay, as were the families of those seamen killed by battle
or disease. The seamen were discharged at Portsmouth or
2 8London and were forced to return home by their own means.
Contemporary observers also criticized the potentially
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detrimental effects such a massive and disorganized
demobilization policy had on English society, especially the
increase in postwar crime. War had a recognized utility for
absorbing the idle, destitute and dangerous poor in the
eighteenth century. The professional seamen of the collier
fleet recognized as early as 1793 that they would be joined
by thousands of non-seamen and perhaps be forced to steal by
29unavoidable circumstances at the conclusion of the war.
During the Peace of Amiens the size of the Navy was
quickly reduced to almost half, from 130,000 to 70,000
seamen, with a proposed reduction to 30,000 by 1803. Between
301813 and 1817, 120,000 seamen were demobilized.
Legislation attempted to alleviate the postwar economic 
problems of ex-naval seamen and to reabsorb this sudden 
labor surplus with a minimum of social disruption. Seamen 
were exempt from the apprenticeship clauses of the 
Elizabethan Statute of Artificers and those "wanting 
subsistence" were permitted to beg if they could prove their 
bona fides under the provisions of the Vagrancy Act of 1744. 
The returning seamen would be forced to compete with the 
landsmen, foreigners, apprentices and Greenland fishermen 
for their former jobs in the collier fleet. To ease this 
problem, the Navigation Acts were reinstituted to compel 
British ships to be manned by British sailors. Although 
employment registers were established for ex-naval seamen in 
1800, demobilized sailors were said to be the largest group
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of beggars in London for a number of years after the French 
31Wars.
After the war,, the colliers used in the military
transport service returned to the collier fleet. This
augmentation of the fleet increased the demand for seamen
but it also increased the coal supply to the Metropolis to
one-third more than could be consumed and reduced the price
of coal to a level which was unprofitable to the
shipowners. A committee of shipowners from Shields and
Sunderland investigated the condition of the postwar coal
trade and concluded that because "victuals and every other
necessary of life is [sic] considerably cheaper . . . there
may be a great reduction of wages from most of the people
employed in the coal trade." The wages of the collier
32seamen were summarily reduced to £3.10s. per voyage --the
level at which they stood at the outbreak of war in February
1.793 . The resulting postwar economic distress was the
precipitating factor in the Tyneside seamen's strike of 
331815.
The strike of 1792 demonstrated the inherent 
difficulties faced by workers organized on only an ad hoc 
basis and in the succeeding years the nature of their 
organization changed. Their increased wages now allowed 
them to contribute to a friendly society. In 1798, nineteen 
Tyneside seamen founded the Sailors' Fund at the Hope and 
Anchor pub in South Shields. The seamen subscribed £400,
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elected a committee of nine to govern the organization and
employed the services of a local schoolmaster for its
secretarial duties. The burial provisions of the Sailors'
Fund represented an attempt by the seamen to achieve a
degree of respectability for their members which was
previously unavailable. This organization also became the
foundation for the more economically powerful and legal
34seamen's trade unions of the nineteenth century.
The methods and organization developed by the collier
seamen in their labor disputes of the 1790s and the economic
security- and social respectability attainable by the
creation of their friendly society were proscribed by the
passage of the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800. Although
these Acts protected legitimate friendly societies, they
also formalized the general stiffening of attitude of
employers and government in the 1790s against workmen's
organizations which could disguise illegal trade unions or
revolutionary conspiracies. These statutes reinforced
existing common law prohibitions by which active trade
unions could be repressed as conspiracies in restraint of
trade but their provisions made convictions of labor
35organizers more speedy and certain.
After the repeal of the Combination Acts, the Tyne 
again became the center of seamen's trade unionism with the 
formation of the "Seamen's Loyal Standard Association for 
Mutual Relief, for the Tyne and Wear" in 1824. The creation
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of this association also represented a drastic change in the
attitudes and methods of their defensive trade unionism as
the seamen sought to gain legitimation for their
organization and respect for their goals. It is ironic that
to accomplish this the seamen had to disavow the very
methods which had served them since the 1790s. The rules of
the Seamen's Loyal Standard Association warned that
should any member or members of this Association 
muster on the river Tyne, in a tumultuous or 
riotous manner, to stop or detain any ship or 
vessel, on any pretence whatever, or to take the 
crew of such ship or vessel out of her against 
their own consent, such member or members shall be 
fined 10s each. And should any member or members 
be committed to prison for such disorderly 
conduct, they shall not ^  supported or relieved 
by the Association. . . .
From 1793 to 1800, the nature of the Tyneside seamen's 
organization changed drastically due to the economic 
conditions of the wartime coal trade. Defensive trade 
unionism to achieve higher wages was no longer as necessary 
because of the general increase in the seamen's standard of 
living and their proven methods of organization were 
ineffective under wartime conditions. In the attempted 
strike of 1796, the seamen could not gain control of the 
port, as they had in 1792, because of the permanent presence 
of the forces of the Impress Service on the Tyne. Their 
methods and organization were essentially nullified for the 
duration of the French Wars, but they were quickly and 
successfully resurrected in the seamen's strike of 1815,
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which followed a course very similar to the strike of 
371792.
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CONCLUSION
The example of the Tyneside collier seamen in the 1790s 
challenges the traditional interpretations of eighteenth 
century labor history. The seamen clearly demonstrated that 
a rudimentary form of defensive trade unionism preceded the 
repeal of the Combination Acts by at least a half a 
century. More importantly, the seamen demonstrated that 
such organization existed among workers who did not conform 
to the standard accepted notions of an eighteenth century 
labor "aristocracy." Although highly skilled, the seamen 
were not highly paid (at the beginning of the 1790s) or 
necessarily literate, and they were without the social and 
economic support of a legal friendly society until the end 
of the decade.
Both the seamen's successes and failures are evidence 
of their recognition of the need to defend their economic 
and occupational interests against the shipowners, the local 
magistrates and the naval and military forces of the central 
government. The seamen's expertise, moderate methods and 
skillful leadership, in conjunction with the support of the 
Tyneside maritime community, enabled them to extract 
concessions from the shipowners successfully in their labor 
disputes.
The seamen's failures, however, also demonstrated the 
inherent weaknesses of labor groups organized only on an ad
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hoc basis without the support of a formal and legal trade 
union. - The methods which allowed them to control the port 
of the Tyne and to paralyze the seaborne coal trade for 
weeks at a time were ineffective when opposed by 
overwhelming naval and military forces. However successful 
these methods might be in achieving their immediate economic 
demands, the seamen had no legal recourse to insure that the 
shipowners would honor concessions once a strike was over.
Despite the intrinsic weaknesses of their organization, 
the legal proscriptions on formal trade unions and the 
suspicions of popular disturbances during the 1790s, the 
example of the Tyneside collier seamen demonstrated that the 
attitudes and methods, if not the ultimate form, of 
defensive trade unionism existed among this particular group 
of workers at the end of the eighteenth century.
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